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Abstract 
 
We study the implications of the Great Recession for voting for anti-establishment parties, as well 
as for general trust and political attitudes, using regional data across Europe. We find a strong 
relationship between increases in unemployment and voting for non-mainstream, especially populist 
parties. We also find a correlation between the increases in unemployment and a decline in trust in 
national and European political institutions, while we find smaller or no effects of unemployment 
on interpersonal trust. The correlation between unemployment and attitudes towards immigrants is 
muted, especially for their cultural impact. In an effort to advance on causation, we extract the 
component of increases in unemployment stemming from the pre-crisis structure of the economy, 
and in particular construction share in regional value added which is strongly related both to build-
up and the burst of the crisis. Crisis-driven economic insecurity is a substantial driver of populism 
and political distrust. An important policy implication from the European economic crisis is that 
national governments and the EU should focus not only on structural reforms, but also at protecting 
trust of their citizens from economic insecurity.  
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1In recent years, the West has seen an unexpected rise of nativist populism culminating in the United
Kingdom’s (UK) vote to exit the European Union and the election of Donald Trump as the US
President in 2016 – as well as a strong showing of Marine Le Pen in the French Presidential
elections in 2017. In continental Europe, the first significant successes of populist politicians took
place even before – with the parties like Freedom Party in Austria, AfD in Germany, Golden Dawn
in Greece, Jobbik in Hungary, Five Star movement in Italy, Law and Justice in Poland, Swedish
Democrats in Sweden, UKIP in the UK gaining substantial ground since 2012. In France, Marine
Le Pen’s National Front came first in the 2014 European elections and in the first round of 2015
regional elections.
The rise of populism in the European Union (EU) is important for many reasons. The EU is
a historically unprecedented supranational unification project (Spolaore (2013)). It has been quite
successful in both preserving political peace in Europe and in integrating into the European
democratic model the “periphery” countries of Southern and Eastern Europe (Gill and Raiser
(2012)). However, the recent economic crisis has demonstrated a number of shortcomings in the
design of European economic and political institutions. As we demonstrate below, many Europeans
appear dissatisfied with local and EU politicians and institutions.
There are two potential explanations of the decline of trust in European Union (EU), the rise
of Eurosceptic populists, and the electoral success of far-left and far-right parties. The first one is a
cultural backlash against progressive values, such as cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, and a
shift towards national identity. Almost all populist parties share a criticism of European
supranational integration and call for a return to supremacy of nationalism. The second explanation
emphasizes economic insecurity, stemming from medium-term impact of globalization and
technological progress (outsourcing, increased competition from low-wage countries, automation)
and/or the sharp increase in unemployment in Europe in the aftermath of the recent economic crisis.
The unemployment rate increased from 7% (7.5%) in 2007 to 11% (12%) in 2013 in the EU
(Euro Area). In 2017–a decade after the start of the crisis–unemployment remains quite high (in
spite of a general downward trend in labour force participation). Unemployment dynamics have
been highly uneven. After a short-lived spike in 2008-2009, unemployment in Germany fell to pre-
crisis levels; in Greece and Spain, it climbed above 20 percent. There has also been substantial
heterogeneity in unemployment dynamics within the periphery and the core (often associated with
Germany and neighbouring economies) and even within countries. For example, in 2016 and 2017
the national unemployment rate in the UK was at 5 per cent – lower than in 2007. However, in a
median NUTS2 region unemployment rate was two percentage points higher than before the crisis.
In Northern Greece unemployment in 2012-2014 hovered around 30%, while in the Aegean and
2Ionian Sea islands it fluctuated between 15% and 21%, as tourism offered a buffer to the crisis.
Likewise, the unemployment in the twenty main Italian regions in 2012-2015 ranged from 6%-7%
in the North (Trento, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia) to above 20% in the South (Campania, Calabria, and
Puglia).
The differential impact of the crisis is key to understand the rise of anti-establishment, often
populist parties, and the accompanying sizable drop of trust towards political parties, the European
Union, and the domestic legal system. Globalization in general and the EU project in particular,
have been successful in promoting growth but have not done as well in terms of assuring that the
gains from this growth have been shared broadly. Large parts of the society feel left behind and
have risen against the establishment, national and European institutions. The recent vintage of
populism unites extreme right and extreme left politicians in their criticism of the elites and the
cross-border integration that these elites represent. In some cases, the rise in unemployment fuels
support for far-left parties (such as Podemos in Spain) and in other – for far-right nationalistic and
xenophobic parties (as in Hungary and the Netherlands). Sometimes, rising unemployment is
accompanied by increased voting for both radical left and ultra-right nationalistic parties, that
increasingly coordinate (as for example the coalition between Syriza and Independent Greeks in the
government since January 2015).1
In this paper, we first conduct a before-after descriptive analysis of the evolution of
unemployment, voting and trust-beliefs across Europe before and after the crisis, showing that the
economic crisis has moved in tandem with a political trust crisis and the rise of populist anti-
establishment vote.
Second, we study the relationship between unemployment and voting for anti-establishment
(far left, far right, populist and Eurosceptic) parties at the subnational level. We compare regions
that greatly suffered from the crisis with those that weathered the crisis relatively well – controlling
for general pan-European or country-group trends. We find that increases in unemployment are
followed by rising voting shares for anti-establishment, especially populist parties. A major finding
of our analysis is that it is the change in unemployment–rather than its level–that correlates with
voting for non-mainstream parties, a result that echoes the findings of the literature on the role of
economic losses on self-reported well-being and happiness.
Although our methodology accounts for time-invariant regional factors and unobserved
country-group dynamics, the estimates may still pick up some unobserved or hard-to-account-for
1 In line with the evident “convergence” of radical-left and extreme-right nationalistic parties and agendas, we find that
the spike in unemployment fuels support for both left and right anti-establishment parties.
3regional time-varying variables. We thus develop a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) approach that
extracts the component of regional unemployment stemming from industrial specialization of the
regional economy, and in particular the share of construction and real estate. Since construction and
real estate played a major role both during the build-up and the burst of the crisis, we use the pre-
crisis share of construction (real estate and housing) as an “instrument” for regional unemployment.
The 2SLS estimates that isolate the component of unemployment stemming from industrial
specialization on voting for non-mainstream parties are statistically significant implying
considerable effects: a one-percentage point increase in unemployment rate is associated with a 2-3
percentage point increase in voting for the anti-establishment parties.
We also use the vote of the citizens of the United Kingdom in the June 2016 referendum to
stay or leave the European Union as an “out-of-sample” test of the Europe-wide results. In line with
our previous estimates, the analysis shows that increases in unemployment during the period 2007-
2015 (rather than the level of unemployment in 2015) are strong predictors of Brexit vote – both in
OLS and 2SLS specifications that also use the pre-crisis share of construction across the 379
electoral districts to instrument for the subsequent spike in regional unemployment.
Third, we explore the mechanisms behind the unemployment–populism nexus examining
the impact of the recession on political and general trust, as well as on the beliefs on the role of
immigrants using individual-level survey data from the European Social Surveys (ESS). There is a
statistically and economically significant relationship between the change in regional
unemployment and a decline in trust towards the European and national parliament and political
parties. An increase in regional unemployment of 5 percentage points (roughly one standard
deviation) implies a 3.5 percentage points drop in trust towards the country’s parliament (roughly a
third of a standard deviation). Unemployment also correlates significantly with distrust towards
national courts, while there is no correlation with trust towards police. The relationship between
regional unemployment and interpersonal trust is much weaker and not always statistically
significant. 2SLS estimates are similar; the component of regional unemployment coming from the
pre-crisis share of construction is a significant correlate of distrust in the European and national
political institutions.
Fourth, we exploit the individual-level nature of the data to understand the underlying
forces. We do not find much heterogeneity. The results hold for both men and women, for younger
and older cohorts. The relationship between unemployment and distrust in political institutions is
stronger for non-college graduates, a result in line with the findings of Autor et al. (2016, 2017),
Che et al. (2016) and Colantone and Stanig (2016), who relate populist voting and political
4polarization to depressed wages among unskilled workers fuelled by rising competition from
low/middle income countries.
Our evidence is consistent with the studies that link the rise of populism in Europe to economic
factors. However, while parallel papers studying the origins of the recent populist spike focus on the
impact of medium term technological factors and rising competition from emerging low-income
countries (e.g., Autor et al. (20016, 2017), Becker et al. (2017)), we stress the role of the Great
Recession. In addition to studying unemployment’s impact on voting we also try to uncover the
mechanisms using survey data on Europeans’ general and institutional trust, political attitudes and
beliefs towards immigration. The latter results allow us shed light on the relative importance of
economics vs. cultural explanations of the recent rise of populism. We find that the recent crisis has
resulted in more negative attitudes towards immigrants; however, this anti-immigrant sentiment is
related to the immigrants’ economic impact rather than their cultural identity.2
I. Related Literature
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature, first and foremost, to the research on the
political economy of populism that studies the origins and implications of populist parties and
policies (see Gidron and Bonikowski (2013) and Mudde and Katwesser (2017) for reviews and
Taggart (2000) for a general introduction). Dornbusch and Edwards (1991) discuss macroeconomic
populism in Latin America, while Rodrik (2017) provides a generic discussion of the recent rise of
populist parties and interprets it in the light of economic theory. Recent theoretical works on the
political economy of populism include Acemoglu et al. (2013), Mukand and Rodrik (2017), Guiso,
Herrera, and Morelli (2017), Di Tella and Rotemberg (2016). A number of recent empirical works
study populism’s correlates/origins in specific contexts. Becker, Fetzer, and Novy (2017) search for
the main correlates of Brexit vote across UK districts looking at dozens of socio-economic
indicators; they find that low levels of education and low income, historical reliance on
manufacturing and to a lesser extent unemployment are significant correlates, while immigration is
not much related. Colantone and Staning (2016) show that globalization in general–and import
competition from China in particular–is a strong correlate of Brexit vote. This is in line with Autor
et al. (2016, 2017) and Che, et al. (2016), who show rising political polarization and higher
likelihood for Trump voting in US counties that were affected the most from China’s entrance to the
WTO.3 Colantone and Stanig (2017) uncover a similar link between import competition and support
for nationalistic right-wing parties across EU regions. Similarly, Dippel, Gold, and Heblich (2016)
2 In contrast to the conventional wisdom, Europeans’ beliefs on the role of immigrants have become more progressive
on average, following the pre-crisis trend (also documented in Alesina, Tabellini and Trebbi (2017)).
3 Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth (2017) also document a correlation between import competition from China and
Mexico and employment in low-skilled services with voting against the incumbent.
5reveal a link between import competition from China and voting for extreme-right parties in
Germany over the period 1997-2009. While this fast-growing strand of the literature focuses on
medium-term origins of political populism-extremism (mostly related to trade and immigration)4,
we examine the impact of the deep economic crisis that has hit Europe during 2008-2009 (alongside
the United States and other industrial countries) and the subsequent crisis in the European periphery
(mostly over 2009-2013).
In line with conventional wisdom and case-study evidence, we show that large economic
downturns fuel political polarization.5 In this regard, our work relates to empirical studies
quantifying recovery after severe (typically short-term) economic downturns, banking, currency,
and balance of payment crises. Recent work by Rogoff (2016) and Fatas and Summers (2016)
connect sluggish recoveries to pre-crisis trends. Our main finding–that the sharp increase in political
extremism and the associated drop of trust in political institutions are strongly correlated with the
severity of the economic downturn–offers a plausible mechanism explaining the considerably long-
term consequences of economic crises. Our results thus complement the findings of Funke et al.
(2016), who, studying 20 advanced economies over 1870-2014, document with panel regressions
that financial crisis increase political polarization, raise fragmentation in the parliament, and spur
political unrest.
The papers closest to ours are the parallel studies of Guiso et al. (2017), Inglehart and Norris
(2016) and Dustmann et al (2017)6. Guiso et al. (2017) study the demand and supply of populism
both empirically and theoretically. They document a link between individual-level economic
insecurity and distrust in political parties, voting for populist parties, and low electoral participation.
They also show how in response to economic insecurity parties shift their agenda to cater to voters’
preferences. Inglehart and Norris (2016) also use survey-level data and argue that the rise of
populism is driven by cultural rather than economic factors. Unlike these two studies, we use actual
region-level voting data rather than self-reported information from surveys (that have quite much
smaller regional coverage and may be subject to reporting biases). Also, we focus on the crisis
impact, in particular the sizable rise in regional unemployment after the 2008-2009 global financial
crisis. Moreover, we develop an instrumental variable approach to identify causal effects and
4 Recent works examining the impact of immigration on voting for extremist/nationalistic parties and attitudes include
Hatton (2016), Becker and Fetzer (2016), Mayda et al. (2016), and Barone et al. (2016). Dinas et al. (2016) study the
link between refugee flows and voting for far-right parties in Greece.
5 Stock (1984) presents cross-county regression evidence that rising indebtedness of American farmers in the run of the
20th century was related to political unrest and voting for populist candidates. Bromhead, Eichengreen, and O’ Rourke
(2014) connect voting with the severity of economic contraction in the inter-war period (1919-1939). Studying 171
elections in 28 countries, they find that the depth and duration of the crisis are related to the rise of far-right parties.
6 Hernandez and Kriesi (2016) report cross-country evidence of a link between the severity of the Great Depression and
the electoral losses of incumbent parties.
6associate regional industrial specialization and especially the pre-crisis boom of construction to the
rise in anti-establishment voting in the aftermath of the crisis. In contrast to Inglehart and Norris
(2016), we find that economic insecurity explains a substantial share of the rise in populism when
controlling for time-invariant factors.7 Our divergence with the latter paper stems from two main
reasons. First, we look at the effect of within-region variation of unemployment on institutional
trust and populism, accounting for all time-invariant factors that affect beliefs and the
economy. Our analysis shows that voting for non-mainstream parties (and BREXIT) and political
distrust are linked to changes (increases) in unemployment during the crisis rather than the level of
unemployment. We show that individuals are mostly sensitive to economic changes, and especially
economic losses. Besides, Inglehart and Norris (2016) by focusing on individual-level variables,
they do not capture the overall impact of economic insecurity that an increase in
unemployment imposes to all categories of citizens, including those who have a job (through
depressing wage growth and undermining life-time incomes). Second, we take a different
perspective on what we consider as cultural values and attitudes compared to Inglehart and Norris
(2016). While they explain the rise of populism by attitudes such as institutional distrust,
we associate distrust directly with unemployment. We show that, since economic insecurity
increases populist voting and spurs distrust in political institutions and dissatisfaction with
democracy, the changes in the latter variables cannot be considered as independent drivers of the
former.8
In concurrent work, Dustmann et al. (2017) also use ESS data and uncover that
unemployment (and GDP) shocks at the regional level are accompanied by a trust deficit (defined
as the ratio of political to general trust). Dustmann et al. (2017) further show that regional
unemployment is systematically linked to non-mainstream vote in European Parliament elections.
These results nicely complement our findings from national (parliamentary and presidential)
elections that are way more important, as the European Parliament has rather limited authority.
Moreover our sample sample is noticeably larger (for voting outcomes we have 220 regions vs. 132
in Dustmann et al. (2013)). We also uncover a link between pre-crisis construction’ share and post-
crisis voting suggesting that the pre-crisis boom before the crisis in many European regions is
7 Our results are also consistent with DeVries (2017) who argues that recent rise of populism was accompanied by the
shift from left-right to cosmopolitan-parochial divide: the regions with a larger increase in unemployment are more
likely to have a negative attitude to immigrants because of their impact on the economy not because of their alien
cultural identity (see also Hobolt and De Vries (2016)).
8 The same caveat holds for most of the variables considered as independent by Inglehart and Norris (2016) such as
attitudes towards immigration, demand for authority and political orientation. Unemployment affects these beliefs
directly. We also check the changes in attitudes to immigrants and find no evidence of cultural backlash; it is only the
economic role of immigrants that results in a more negative sentiment towards them.
7related to the recent spike of populism. The associated 2SLS estimates suggest that the component
of changes in regional unemployment stemming from pre-crisis industrial specialization is a
significant correlate of voting and trust.
Our paper also contributes to the large body of research linking trust (as well as civicness,
social capital, and beliefs) with economic performance (see Algan and Cahuc (2013), Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales (2011), Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005), Fernandez (2014) for detailed
surveys of the theoretical and empirical literature). While there has been extensive research on the
implications of trust and social/civic capital for various aspects of economic performance (e.g.,
Tabellini (2010), Algan and Cahuc (2010)), the literature on its origins is relatively thin. Building
on Robert Putnam’s influential work (Putnam 1994), empirical works uncover the long-run impact
of important historical episodes, for example the culture of city-states in medieval Italy (Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales (2016a)), the role of Africa’s slave trades (Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)),
and the role of communism and the secret police in Eastern Germany (Jacob and Tyrell (2010)).
Our paper contributes to the previous research in several ways. First, instead of looking at
long-run determinants of trust and culture, we study the impact of the crisis. In this sense, our work
is conceptually close to Ananiev and Guriev (2015) who provide evidence linking the severity of
the 2009 crisis in Russia on general trust. Second, while the literature has focused on interpersonal
trust, we look at trust in political institutions (courts, police, political parties, the European Union),
a largely unexplored dimension that has only recently received attention from economists. We show
that trust in institutions is much more volatile and influenced by the business cycles than
interpersonal trust. We also link the rise of populism and political extremism to distrust in national
and European political institutions – thus contributing to the research on the interactions between
cultural norms/beliefs and institutions (see Alesina and Giuliano (2015) for a review and Bisin and
Verdier (2017) for a recent theoretical exposition). We document that institutional trust is the
critical element for understanding political preferences and voting behavior.
Third, our paper fits to the research agenda on the political economy of the European Union
– and of political unions more generally (see Spolaore (2013) for an overview of the political
science and economics research on the EU and Alesina and Spolaore (2005) for a textbook
treatment of political integration). Until recently, policymakers and economists have focused on the
long-term economic convergence – discussing the issues of debt, deficit, and inflation. However,
the European crisis has shifted their attention to cultural differences across countries and regions.9
9 Papaioannou (2016, 2015) stresses the importance of divergence in the performance of national institutions (courts,
bureaucracy, public administration); see also Alesina, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2017) on rising national institutional
divergence since the inception of the euro.
8Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2016b) study historical data from the Eurobarometer Surveys
documenting that the considerable cross-country gaps in supporting the European Union have
closed. Convergence of EU support came partly from falling support in the South. Guiso, Herrera,
and Morelli (2016) stress cultural differences between Northern and Southern European countries
and argue that future integration (with common enforcement) is needed to confront the “cultural
clash.“ However, in an important contribution Alesina, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2017) show that what
is striking in the EU is the high degree of within-country (rather than cross-country) heterogeneity
in beliefs and trust. Applying simple variance decompositions on various cultural proxies from the
World Value Surveys during the period 1980-2007, Alesina, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2017) show that
within-country variation dwarfs between-country variability, a pattern that is similar across US
states. They show that the degree of cultural heterogeneity across and within EU countries was
similar to that in the US, an allegedly efficient and well-functioning political and currency union.
Our paper complements this work by studying the crisis and subsequent recovery period. We find
that the crisis has stopped the process of cultural convergence. The rise in unemployment has been
accompanied by a fall in political trust and a rise in political extremism and populism, therefore
creating additional strains within the EU.
Finally, our finding that it is changes in the economic situation, and not the level of it, that
matters is related to the “happiness” literature and the well-known Easterlin paradox of a small
correlation between income and happiness (Easterlin (1974, 2013), Kahneman and Deaton
(2010)). Individuals are mostly sensitive to changes in income –rather than income levels; and this
effect is transitory as individuals adapt rather quickly their expectations and habits to the new
income level (see Clark et al. (2012) for a literature review on the adaptation and habituation effect
for explaining well-being). And research in psychology reveals a strong asymmetry in the way
positive and negative economic growth are experienced,  individual well-being being much more
sensitive to income losses (De Neve (2015)). We find a similar relationship between unemployment
and institutional trust and political attitudes.
II. Data and Descriptive (Before-After) Analysis
II.A Data Description
We use three main types of data. First, we compile regional unemployment and output statistics at
NUTS-2 from Eurostat. We also use Eurostat to extract information on sectoral shares of six broad
industries (construction, agriculture, finance, government, manufacturing, and trade-commerce) in
gross value added. The data cover 215 regions in 26 countries10. For analytical purposes, we group
10 There are gaps in the data that result in an unbalanced panel. .
9countries in four categories. The North comprises of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Sweden
and the United Kingdom. The South includes Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The Centre
consists of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The former
Transition economies group in Eastern Europe is composed of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Second, we collect voting data for parliamentary and presidential elections using country-
specific electoral archives. We then obtain information on political parties’ orientation using the
Chapel Hill Expert Survey and other online resources (which in turn follows Hix and Lord (1997)
and Derksen). Unfortunately, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey while it details main party attributes,
does not cover all parties. We have thus identified and classified the remaining parties based on
their platforms from their websites. We focus on four main aspects of anti-establishment politics: (i)
Extreme right, often nationalistic, parties, such as the Golden Dawn in Greece and the National
Front in France; (ii) Radical left parties, such as Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece; (iii)
Populist parties, such as the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands and UKIP in the UK (iv).
Eurosceptic and separatist parties, such as the Five Star Movement in Italy and True Finns in
Finland. These four components are non-mutually exclusive (with the exception of radical left and
far right). Most populist parties appear also as Eurosceptic (partial correlation of 0.72). The
correlation of euroscepticism with extreme right and radical left is 0.45 and 0.52, respectively. The
correlations between populist and far right and radical left are 0.53 and 0.61, respectively11.
After matching the electoral data with parties’ political orientation, we calculate the
percentage of votes to parties with each of the four “extremist” orientation dimensions over the total
valid votes at each election for each region. We also sum the votes of all types of non-mainstream
parties, classified as far right, radical left, populist and eurosceptic/separatist. We also study the
dynamics of turnout, defined as the percentage of voters over registered. [We will use in the paper
“anti-estasblishment” and “extremist” interchangingly. However, we should stress than not all
policies advocated by these parties are “extremist”. And in many of these parties, there are
moderate elected officials.]
Third, we use individual-level data on trust and beliefs-attitudes from the European Social
Survey (ESS), conducted biennially, from 2000 until 2014. ESS consists of biennial cross-sectional
11 The CHES database contains much information on parties’ political platform that we do not use, the reason being
incomplete coverage. Another limitation is that our classification does not reflect small movements in political ideology
of mainstream parties or the election with mainstream parties of radical candidates in the parliament. However, if non-
extremist parties also take in some issues extremist views or embrace populist polices, then our estimates will be
conservative (Colantone and Stanig (2017), Inglehart and Norris (2016)). Guiso et al. (2017) develop an elegant model
of the response of established parties to voter’s beliefs and the emergence of new parties.
10
surveys, covering 32 European nations. We exclude Israel, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. We also
drop Croatia and Lithuania, as there are no surveys before the crisis and Luxembourg that lacks a
post-crisis survey. There have been seven rounds (in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and
2014)12. The (pseudo)-panel is not balanced, as the ESS study has not been carried in all countries
for all waves. Our ESS sample covers 183 NUTS-2 regions in 24 countries.
The ESS team interviews residents, regardless of their nationality, citizenship, language, or
legal status. On average, each country-round survey covers approximately 2,000 individuals. While
the sample is small, ESS asks questions on beliefs along various dimensions, such as the role of
immigrants and minorities, trust towards courts and the police, beliefs on the role of government.
We focus on general trust and trust towards political institutions (politicians, national parliament,
the European Parliament, the United Nations, national courts, and the police). We also examine
related questions, reflecting respondents’ self-identified position on the left-right scale, satisfaction
with democracy, beliefs on whether the EU has gone too far. Since the variables have different
scales, we standardize them to range between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating more trust. For
the baseline analysis, we average the data across NUTS2 regions for each ESS country-round,
though we also use the data at the individual level when we examine heterogeneity.
The Data Appendix provides details on coverage. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the
main variables at the regional level, distinguishing between the pre-crisis period (2000-2007) and
the post-crisis period (2008-2016). Below we provide a descriptive analysis of the patterns trying to
detect whether or not there is “structural break” at the crisis.
II.B Before-After Crisis Dynamics
II.B.1 Regional Unemployment
Figure 1a plots the evolution of unemployment (for individuals aged between 15 and 64 years old)
between 2000 and 2016. Before the crisis unemployment was below 10% cross all country-groups.
Differences were moderate with unemployment in the South and former Transition hovering around
8%-9%, in the Centre at 6.5%-7%, and the North around 5%-6%. Unemployment increased during
the global financial crisis (2008-2010) across all (groups) countries. But, the spike in the Core was
moderate while at the same time, in the South the unemployment rates doubled. In Greece, the
unemployment rate (across 14 NUTS2 areas) jumps from 9% in 2007 to 27% in 2013 and then falls
to 23%-25%. Mean (median) unemployment across Spain’s 20 NUTS-2 regions jumps from 7.5%
(8.9%) in 2007 to 23.6% (25.7%) in 2013 and then drops somewhat to around 20%.
12 Data from the 2016 survey will be available in the fall of 2017.
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The histogram of regional unemployment (the before-crisis period ranges between 2000 and
2008, and the post crisis period ranges between 2009 and 2016) in Figure 1b illustrates the increase
in the mean and variance. Compared to the pre-crisis distribution, the distribution of unemployment
in 2013 has a long right tail, indicative of the very high unemployment rates observed at particular
regions after the crisis. The standard deviation of NUTS-2 unemployment doubles (from 0.037 to
0.071); the effect again mostly comes from the South. Eight EU regions (six in Spain and two in
Greece) exhibit unemployment rates exceeding 30% in 2013; ten other EU regions have
unemployment rates between 25% and 30%.13
Figure 1a Figure 1b
II.B.2 Voting
Table 1, Panel B reports the mean, median, and standard deviation of voting for extremist parties
and political participation before and after 2008. Let’s start with turnout. Mean (median)
participation in parliamentary, presidential or general elections before the crisis was 70% (74%),
while after the crisis it falls to 67% (68%). This drop mostly comes from the South where
participation falls from 74% to 68% and former transition economies, where turnout drops from
57% to 52%. Participation falls slightly in the North and Centre.
Table 1 Panel B demonstrates the considerable increase in voting for extremist parties. The
mean (median) share of extremist parties before the crisis (2000-2008) was 25% (20%); they climb
13 We focus on unemployment rather than on output as the latter is conceptually a less clean measure of the crisis’ social
costs. Moreover, regional GDP statistics are quite noisy, yielding biased (attenuated in the case of classical error-in-
variables) estimates. In the Supplementary Appendix we show that changes in regional unemployment rates and
changes in log regional output are closely correlated. Appendix Figure A1a graphs the association between
unemployment and log GDP per capita, conditioning on region and general year fixed-effects. There is a statistically
significant negative relationship between the two variables with few outliers corresponding to regions of former
transition economies. Appendix Figure A1b plots the correlation of changes in regional unemployment to changes in the
logarithm of GDP per capita over the crisis period. The graphical analysis paints a clearer picture regarding the loss of
income and employment after the crisis across different country groups.
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to 31% (32%) after 2008. Figure 2a plots the distributions. There is an evident shift of the mean and
median values to the right; the shape of the distribution is also different in the second period, with
an increased concentration in the range of medium and high percentage of extremist outcomes. The
increase in the voting share of extremist parties is strong in the South; the change in the mean
(median) is close to 6% and 12%. Voting for extremist parties also rises in the North, with the
increases in the mean and in the median of 3% and 5.3%, respectively.
Figure 2a
Figures 2b-2e show that the voting share of all four types of non-mainstream parties has
increased, though at a differential pace.
Figure 2b Figure 2c
Voting for radical left parties displays a small increase of just 1%, though there is
considerable heterogeneity across countries (Figure 2b). It grows in Spain (Podemos), Greece
(Syriza) and to a lesser extent in Portugal (Bloco de Esquerda,) and Finland (Vasemmisto). And it
falls in Slovakia (Communist Party of Slovakia), Italy (Communist Refoundation Party), and
France (Workers' Struggle). Mean (median) voting for far-right parties goes from 7% (2%) to 10%
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(7%). The rise of far-right parties mostly comes from the North and Centre (rather than the South
and Eastern European countries), where the increase is around 5%-7%. The rise of far-right party
voting is considerable in Hungary (increase of 8.5%) and Greece (increase of 5%).  Voting for
populist parties increases considerably (Figure 2d); the mean moves from 13 to 22 percent, while
the median almost triples. This increase is strong in the South, the North, and Centre. Only in
former transition countries the mean share for populist parties does not go up, as the sizable
increase in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland is offset by declines in Estonia, Romania,
Slovenia and Slovakia. Eurosceptic parties are also on the rise (Figure 2e). The mean (median) vote
increases by 6% (10%). This rise is strong in the South, where the mean and median increase by
15%, and in the North where the mean (median) increase from 12% (16%) to 22%.
Figure 2d Figure 2e
II.B.3 Trust and Beliefs
Let us start with the evolution of general trust, presented in Figure 3a. If anything, interpersonal
trust across European regions somewhat increased, since the crisis. Though the increase in the mean
and median is small, this pattern applies with all proxy measures of general trust (see Table 1-Panel
C). The slight increase is present both in the countries of the European core and in the periphery.
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Figure 3a Figure 3b
The situation with trust in political institutions is quite different. There is a sharp decline in
the trust in national political system in the post-crisis period. The mean value of trust towards the
national parliament falls by 3 points (from 45 to 42 points on the 0-100 scale), roughly half of the
pre-crisis standard deviation.  As Figure 3b shows, after 2008 the distribution moves to the left.
There is also a significant drop in a similar question reflecting trust towards politicians. Figure 3c
shows that distrust is not limited to the political system; it extends to the legal system, though to a
lesser extent. South drives this result. In former transition countries, there is no movement, while in
the countries of the European core trust towards national courts slightly increases.  Interestingly,
trust towards the police moves in the opposite direction increasing with the crisis (Figure 3d), a
pattern driven by transition economies and the core, but being absent in the South (there trust
towards the police remains flat). Distrust towards political parties and national courts reflect a
general dissatisfaction with the functioning of democratic institutions, driven mostly by the South,
where mean satisfaction falls from 0.55 to 0.42. [In the Centre, North, and former transition
countries satisfaction with democracy slightly increases on average.]
Figure 3c Figure 3d
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To measure the change in trust towards the European Union, we use the ESS question on the trust in
the European Parliament. There is a significant decline (Figure 3e); median drops from roughly a
third of the pre-crisis standard deviation. The deterioration in trust towards the EU is considerable
in the South (from 0.54 to 0.5), but present in all groups of countries. Distrust towards the EU
increases in all EU countries except for Belgium, Netherlands and Denmark (where it stays flat) and
Sweden where it falls modestly. The post-crisis distribution of trust in the European Parliament has
a long left tail. As Europeans’ trust towards the EU is falling, their views on whether the EU should
go further or whether it has gone too far have, on average, also change (Table 1, Panel C). We also
tabulate the distribution of trust towards the United Nations (Figure 3f). Distrust in the UN may
capture anti-globalization sentiment or an overall dissatisfaction with international institutions, but
it does not have the European angle. There is some decline in trust towards the UN, but it is smaller
relative to the drop in trust towards the EU. The sizable drop in trust towards the EU and domestic
institutions is in line with the Eurobarometer Survey data based study of Frieden and Foster (2017),
who also document large drops in political trust in EU-debtor countries.
Figure 3e Figure 3f
We also examined political positioning on the left-right scale and closeness to a particular
party. There is no indication that Europeans are, on average, moving to the left or to the right
(Figure 4a). Yet, there is a clear shift of the distribution on the question on whether respondents feel
close to a particular party, with a larger share responding that they do not (Figure 4b).
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Figure 4a Figure 4b
Given extremist, nationalistic, and populist parties often embrace an anti-minority and anti-
immigration agenda, we examined the evolution of variables reflecting European’s beliefs on
immigration. Table 1, Panel D, gives means and medians before and after the crisis. ESS data show
no major change in attitudes towards the immigrants – or even a more welcoming stance. On
average, Europeans are more likely to allow immigration of the same or different race (increase of 2
percentage points from 59 and 51 percent, respectively). They appear also ready to welcome
immigrants from poorer countries. They still believe that immigrants make the country a better
place to live (two percentage points increase from 48 percent before the crisis. Figures 5a and b plot
the change in the distribution of the belief that immigrants enrich the country’s cultural life that of
the belief that immigrants are good for the country’s economy.
Figure 5a Figure 5b
III. The European Crisis and the Rise of Populism
In this Section, we analyse the role of unemployment on voting for non-mainstream (populist, far
right, radical left, and Eurosceptic) parties and on turnout. First, we report the within-region
correlations that assess whether the European crisis and the rise of anti-establishment vote are
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related. Second, we discuss an instrumental-variables approach that aims to identify causal effects
and then report the 2SLS estimates. Third, we carry out an “out-of-sample” test of the link between
the crisis and populist voting, associating regional differences in unemployment across the United
Kingdom during the crisis (during 2007-2014) and voting for Brexit in the June 2016 referendum.
III.AOLS estimates
We examine the role of unemployment with the four types of anti-establishment vote and turnout
rate using two (closely related) approaches that exploit within-NUTS2 region variation14.
First, we run panel fixed effects specifications that explore within-region variation over
time. We use the full sample period that extends from 2000 till the mid of 2017 (including the
recent elections in France, Netherlands, Bulgaria and the United Kingdom).15 Table 2 reports the
results. In Panel A we include year dummies to account for general trends in unemployment and
voting patterns across the EU. As there are not many elections in a given year, we also run
specifications with four sub-period dummies. We split the sample into two pre-crisis periods (2000-
2003, 2004-2008) and two post-crisis periods (2009-2012 and 2013-2017). Panel B presents the
results. In Panel C we interact the period dummies with the four country-group category dummies,
so as to allow for differential dynamics in unemployment and voting across the South, Centre, East
and North of Europe.
Second, we carry out difference-in-differences estimations that associate post-vs-pre-crisis
differences in the various electoral outcomes with analogous differences in regional unemployment.
Specifically, we average all observations after the crisis (2009-2017) and before the crisis (2000-
2008) and then estimate the model in differences (dropping 2008 altogether or assigning it to the
post crisis period does not change the results in any way). 16 Table 3 presents these estimates. In
Panel A we do not include any controls, while in Panel B we add country-group dummies that
account for differential pre-post crisis changes in unemployment and voting.
Let us first discuss the within-region correlation between the composite anti-establishment
vote (i.e. the vote for far right, far left, populist and Eurosceptic parties) and unemployment. The
coefficient on unemployment is significant in all panels of Table 2. There is a one-to-one
14 Ideally, we would want to run the specification at the electoral district level to account for strategic voting and other
election-related unobserved issues (proportional or majoritarian system). However, we lack data on output-
unemployment at the electoral district. As Colantone and Stanig (2017) show, NUTS2 regions include (in most
countries) more than one electoral districts.
15 The specification is as follows: , , = , , + + + , , . Here y denotes non-mainstream party vote in
NUTS region r in country c in year (period) t and U denotes regional unemployment rate.
16 The difference specification reads: , = + , + , where y and denote changes in
regional non-mainstream party vote and unemployment over the post-crisis period (mean over 2017-2009) and the pre-
crisis period (mean over 2008-2001).
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relationship between unemployment and the anti-establishment voting. The before-after
specification in Table 3 column (1) also yields a significant and similar in magnitude estimate. The
link between unemployment and anti-establishment voting is strongest in the South, considerable in
the North and Transition economies (the magnitude is 0.5); and it is absent in the Centre (the results
by the four country groups are available on request). Figure 6a illustrates the before-after
correlation, distinguishing between NUTS2 districts across the main macro regions.
Figure 6a
In columns (2) and (3) we assess separately the role of unemployment in voting for far-left
and far-right parties. The results in Table 2’s Panels A and B point out that higher unemployment
are mostly related to voting for the far left parties. The coefficient at the unemployment rate in the
regression with voting for far-right parties is small and not statistically significant, while it is
significant in the far-left party share models. A similar pattern emerges in Panel A of Table 3.
Figure 6b Figure 6c
The results change when we add country-group specific period effects (in Panel C of Table
2 and Panel B of Table 3). The estimates are now comparable in magnitude (both in the panel and
difference specifications), but the coefficients for far-left and Eurosceptic parties are no longer
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significant; the coefficient at unemployment is statistically significant in the voting for far-right and
populist parties. We examine further the relationship between unemployment and specific types of
anti-establishment vote in each of the four main macro regions (results are available on request
though they are visualized in the figures). The link between unemployment and the far right vote is
present in all country groups; it is stronger in the South and somewhat weaker in the East. In
contrast, the relationship between unemployment and the far left vote is quite heterogeneous. It is
strong in the South (with the rise of Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece), insignificant in the
North and Centre, and negative and significant in former transition economies, where people seem
to turn their back in communist parties leaning towards right-wing nationalists.
In column (4) we assess the relationship between unemployment and voting for populist
parties. In all specifications, the coefficients on unemployment are positive and highly significant.
The results from the before-after crisis estimations are also highly significant (Table 3), as shown
also in Figure 6d. The standardized “beta” coefficient is around 0.4 in the panel specifications and
0.5 in difference specifications. A one percentage point increase in unemployment is associated
with one percentage point increase the populist vote. When we estimate the models by country
groups, we find a strong effect in the South. The correlation is also present in the East and the
Centre; it is not significant only in the Northern European countries.
Figure 6d Figure 6e
In column (5) we focus on the voting share of parties with an explicit anti-European or
separatist agenda. The coefficients on unemployment in Table 2’s Panels A and B and in Panel A of
Table 3 are statistically significant; the magnitude of the coefficient is again close to 1. This pattern
is illustrated in Figure 6e. While the positive relationship between unemployment and the
Eurosceptic vote pertains in all four macro regions, once we account for differential macro-region
time trends the panel estimates do not yield statistically significant results.
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In column (6) we report results on turnout. The coefficient at unemployment rate is negative
and significant; an increase in unemployment of 5 percentage points (roughly one standard
deviation) is associated with a decrease in turnout of 2.5 percentage points (around 0.2 of standard
deviation). The difference specifications yield less clear, though similar, results. The correlation is
strong in in Panel A, but once we account for different trends in the North, South, East, and Centre
the coefficient loses significance17. There is however substantial heterogeneity, as the correlation
between the changes in non-participation and the changes in unemployment rate is quite strong in
the East, present in the South, but absent in the North and the Centre.
III.B Instrumental Variables Estimations
The OLS estimates linking unemployment with voting do not necessarily imply a causal
relationship. By exploiting within-region variation, we control for all time-invariant features
shaping voting for non-mainstream parties and unemployment. However, we cannot rule out that
some omitted time-varying regional factors drive the correlation. Reverse causation is in principle
another concern, though few would argue that it was the rise in populist and Eurosceptic voting
(and the decline in political trust, discussed in the next section) that led to the downturn of 2008-
2010 and the deep recessions in the European periphery. Another concern is error-in-variables that
is likely to be non-negligible. Unemployment statistics are noisy; they do not account well for part-
time employment and workers marginally attached to the labor force. Moreover, official statistics
miss activities in the shadow economy, which are not small in the South and the East.
To estimate the causal effects of the crisis on voting for non-mainstream parties, we develop
an instrumental variables approach that uses the share of construction in regional value added as an
“excluded instrument”. [We use the same approach in the next section for estimating the causal
effect of unemployment on trust, beliefs and attitudes]. Construction (and real estate) played a key
role both in the build-up to the 2008-2009 financial crisis and in its severity. The role of
construction in fuelling the crisis had a global dimension, and it was not simply a US phenomenon
(see for example Fernandez-Villaverde, Garicano, Santos (2013), Fernandez-Villaverde and
Ohanian (2009), Lane (2014), and Reis (2015)). The rise of construction and real estate services
was important in the pre-crisis boom in Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, the United Kingdom,
Cyprus, and some Eastern European countries as well, contributing among others to misallocation
and higher inflation (e.g., Gopinath, et al. (2017)).
17 Using individual-level survey data form ESS, Guiso et al. (2017) estimate “selection” models t(Heckprobit) hat
jointly associate unemployment with turnout and voting. They also find that unemployment and economic insecurity are
negatively correlated with turnout.
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Our identification strategy is based on two assumptions. First, the share of construction in
the regional economy affects unemployment, even when accounting for other sectoral shares. We
test this assumption below and show that this is indeed the case. Second, the share of construction
should affect voting (trust, beliefs and attitudes) only via its impact on unemployment. While
directly testing this “exclusion restriction” is not possible, it seems reasonable that the primary
impact of changes in regional specialization on voting and attitudes is via unemployment, especially
in the short term that we focus on. [Below we discuss some alternative mechanisms and provide
evidence that they are unlikely to be important in our setting.] In the before-after difference
specifications the pre-crisis share of construction in regional value added should affect voting (and,
in the next section, trust and attitudes) via its impact on regional unemployment.
The share of construction in regional value added is quite low (mean-median 6.5%-7%).
Together with agriculture, it is the less important broad sector of the economy in our sample of
European regions (see Table 1). For comparison the mean share of finance, manufacturing, trade,
and government exceed 20%. So, swings in construction are less likely to be endogenous to
unobserved features that may affect voting and trust. Moreover, there is substantial variability in the
share of construction; the range across the 227 regions goes from 2.35% to 15.25% in 2007. The
within-country variation is also substantial. Construction share in Greece ranges from 6% to 13%;
in Germany from 2.5% to 7.2%; in Italy from 4.7% to 8.4%; and in Belgium from 2.6% to 7.5%.
III.B.1 First-Stage Results. Construction Share and Regional Unemployment.
We start the 2SLS analysis with an examination of the “first stage” relationship between
unemployment and the share of construction in regional value added. Table 4 reports various
specifications associating unemployment and construction. Panel A reports panel (region fixed-
effects) specifications with year constants (in columns (1)-(2)) and country-group specific year
effects (in (3)-(4)). The coefficient on the share of construction is highly significant in all
specifications. The most conservative estimate (in (4)), where we allow for different trends across
the main country groups and also control for regions’ industrial composition implies that a 1
percentage point increase in the share of construction is associated with a  0.9 drop in
unemployment. This translates into a standardized “beta” coefficient of around 0.3.18 Figures 7a-b
plot the correlation between construction share and unemployment controlling for region and period
fixed effects (as well as shares of all sectors of the economy). The relationship is strong and
significant in each of the four country-groups.
18 Appendix Table 2 reports specifications using lagged values of construction and other-than-construction industry
shares. The results are similar.
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In Table 4-Panel B we focus on the crisis period.  The dependent variable is the difference in
regional unemployment before and after the financial crisis. As before, for the post-crisis we take
the average over 2001 -2008 and for the pre-crisis we use the 2000-2007 mean. The main
independent variable is the pre-crisis share of construction. As industrial shares are noisy and there
are gaps in the Eurostat data, we use the 2004-2007 mean (though in Appendix Table 3 we show
that using the 2007 or even earlier single year values yields similar though somewhat attenuated
coefficients). We find that a higher pre-crisis share of construction is associated with an increase in
regional unemployment since 2009. The coefficient on the pre-crisis share of construction is
statistically significant implying that regional specialization in construction in the booming 2002-
2007 years contributed to the drop in economic activity and associated rise in unemployment post
2008-2010. The estimate (standardized beta) in column (4) is 0.8 (0.32) quite similar to the panel
specifications in the full panel, implying economically sizable effects19. Figures 7c-d plot the
correlation between changes in unemployment during the crisis and the pre-crisis share of
construction, also conditioning on regional sectoral composition.
Figure 7a Figure 7b
19 In Appendix Table 4 we regress changes in unemployment over various periods (2016-2008, 2015-2008, 2014-2008,
2013-2008, and 20120 to the pre-crisis share of construction in regional value added (conditional on other sectoral
shares and country-group fixed-effects). The initial share of construction always enters with a negative coefficient that
is larger (and more precisely estimated) when we look at the immediate aftermath of the crisis. The coefficient on initial
construction share when we focus on changes in unemployment over 2012-2008 is 0.66; then is steadily declines to 0.41
over 2015-2008 and to 0.27 over 2016-2008. As the European economies rebound from the deep recession of 2009-
2012, the role of the pre-crisis share of construction weakens. Likewise, we associated 5-year, 6-year, and 7-year
changes in regional unemployment to initial share of construction in regional value added. Initial construction enters
with a significantly positive coefficient only when we look at post-pre crisis windows. When we examine the
association before the crisis or in 2016-2015 there is no systematic link between changes in unemployment and
construction share.
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Figure 7c Figure 7d
III.B.2 Reduced-Form. Construction Share and Extremist Voting
We now turn to the “reduced-form” specifications that associate voting patterns with the share of
construction. Table 5 reports the panel estimates. As the region fixed effects account for time-
invariant regional features that may shape voting and industrial composition, variation comes from
within-region changes. There is a strong and significant relationship between the share of
construction in the regional economy and the vote share of the anti-establishment parties. This
result holds in all specifications. The coefficient in Panel C’s column (1) implies that one percent
increase in the share of construction is associated with three percentage point increase in anti-
establishment vote. The effect is strongest for the populist parties (coefficient around 3), followed
by Eurosceptic parties (around 2) and far left and far right parties (with the magnitude between 1
and 1.7). There is no significant effect of construction share on the turnout rate.
One may wonder whether some other-than-construction industrial share correlates with
voting patterns. We thus re-estimated all specifications in Table 5 adding as controls the share of all
main sectoral shares. Appendix Table 5 reports the panel estimates that associate voting patterns for
non-mainstream parties and turnout with the shares in regional value added of construction,
agriculture  (incl. forestry, fishing, and mining), trade, government, and finance (with
manufacturing serving as the omitted category)20. Two main patterns emerge. First, the construction
share enters in all specifications with a negative coefficient that is usually statistical significant.
This implies that the impact of construction on voting for extremist parties is also significant once
we condition for the potential role of other sectors in voting. The coefficient on regional
construction share in explaining voting for extremist parties in column (1) of Panel C is -3.9, quite
similar to the analogous estimate in Table 5. Second, no consistent pattern emerges regarding the
link between voting for non-mainstream parties and the share of other than construction sectoral
20 We also re-estimated the panel specifications using lagged values of construction and other sectors. The results are
similar and not reported for brevity.
24
shares in regional value added. For example, the coefficients at the share of finance and the share of
government services are not statistically significant in all specifications.
We also estimated “reduced-form” before-after crisis specifications; these specifications,
reported in Table 6, associate changes in voting patterns before and after the crisis with the pre-
crisis share of construction (conditional also on country-group constants and/or the shares of all
other industries in regional value added). The merit of these specifications is that the pre-crisis share
of construction is unlikely to be related to changes in voting patterns, except for its impact on
regional unemployment – established in Table 4’s Panel B (see Figures 7c-d). The pre-crisis share
of construction in regional value added is correlated with changes for voting for the composite
measure of anti-establishment parties, while it is unrelated to changes in turnout. Figures 8.a-f
illustrate the “reduced-form” relationship between pre-crisis share of construction and changes in
voting for non-mainstream parties and turnout.
Figure 8a Figure 8b
Figure 8c Figure 8d
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III.B.3 2SLS
Table 7 gives 2SLS estimates that combine the “reduced-form” estimates with the first-stage
relationship. Panel A presents 2SLS panel fixed effects estimates, controlling for period dummies
(the results with year dummies are similar). In Panel B, we control for the share in regional value
added of agriculture, finance, commerce, and government services. Panel C and D are similar but
include country-group-specific period dummies that account in a flexible way for differential trends
in unemployment, regional specialization, and voting across Northern, Eastern, Northern, and
Central Europe21.
In all specifications unemployment (instrumented by the share of construction in regional
value added) has a statistically significant effect on the anti-establishment vote. The coefficient is
somewhat higher than in the OLS estimates. A one percentage point increase in unemployment is
associated with 2 to 3.9 percent increase in the aggregate voting share of anti-establishment parties.
As in the reduced form estimates, the effect is strongest for the populist parties followed by
Eurosceptic and far left parties. We find no significant impact of unemployment on the turnout rate.
The difference-in-differences specifications in Table 8 yield similar although somewhat
smaller estimates.  A five percent higher share of construction before the crisis is associated with an
increase in the vote share of the anti-establishment parties by 7.5 to 10 percentage points. The effect
mostly stems from a link between pre-crisis construction share and increases in voting for far left
and populist parties and to a lesser extent on Eurosceptic parties. Appendix Table 6 reports
otherwise identical specifications; but since the rise of populist and far left/right parties occurred
after the peak of the crisis, we associate changes in the anti-establishment voting from 2013-2017 to
2007-2004 with the corresponding changes in unemployment instrumented with the pre-crisis
21 The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-test of the first stage is 26, 14, 20 and 16, implying a good fit. The critical values of the
Stock and Yogo (2002) tabulations on weak instruments are 16.38 and 8.96 for the 10% and 15% level.
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construction share. The 2SLS coefficients are similar implying that the impact of the crisis is a
strong correlate of voting for non-mainstream political parties.
III.B.4 Threats to Identification
The uncovered “reduced form” link between the share of construction in regional value added and
voting patterns (in Table 6) and the strong relationship between construction and unemployment (in
Table 5) do not necessarily imply a causal nexus between construction – unemployment – non-
mainstream voting. A necessary condition is that construction should not affect voting directly or
via other-than-unemployment channels. It is challenging establishing this. Yet, we believe that it is
reasonable that at least in the short-run the link between construction and voting should work via
unemployment.
An alternative likely mechanism regards corruption; perhaps construction, a sector more
dependent on government connections, promotes to graft, which in turn affects voting for non-
mainstream parties (see De Vries and Solaz (2017) for an overview of works on the electoral
consequences of corruption). As the ESS includes three corruption perception questions (though
only in the 2004 round), we examined whether there is a link between the share of construction and
corruption, failing, however, to detect any significant cross-regional correlation22.
Another probable mechanism regards education. If regions specializing in construction or
experiencing increases in construction have lower levels of human capital (as construction is not a
skill-intensive sector), then the 2sls estimate may pick-up the role of education (which is related to
higher values of trust and lower shares of non-mainstream voting). We thus estimated specifications
controlling for time-varying regional mean education using data from Eurostat that reports
educational attainment shares. While education and voting patterns exhibit a strong negative cross-
sectional correlation, once we add region fixed-effects the correlation loses significance. The same
applies with construction; while construction and education are strongly correlated across regions,
the within-region correlation weakens and becomes insignificance. Likewise, the pre-crisis share of
completed tertiary education is unrelated to subsequent changes in unemployment and voting. Since
the within-region correlations between construction, education, and voting are weak, the 2sls
estimates are similar. Conditional on (changes in) education, there is a significant correlation
between the component of regional unemployment stemming from construction and voting for non-
mainstream parties.
22 The 2004 round ESS questions ask respondents: (i) How often a public official has asked a favour/bribe in return for
a service in the past 5 years; (ii) How wrong it is for a public official to ask for favour/bribe in return for a bribe; and
(iii) How often has the respondent offered a favour/bribe to a public official in the past 5 years.
27
A related concern regards the potential link between construction and immigration, as quite
often immigrants from low/middle income countries work in construction in the United Kingdom,
Germany, France, and other countries. We estimated 2sls models controlling for the share of ESS
respondents who were not born in the country and who are not part of a country’s majority ethnicity
group. We also used Eurostat data on net migration and controlled for regional migration patterns.
Construction is not much related to immigration and, as such, the 2sls estimates are unaffected.
Taken together, the OLS and the 2SLS panel and difference post-pre crisis specifications
imply that the rise of unemployment during the Great Recession and the component of the crisis
stemming from the 2008 share of construction has a large causal effect on the rise of populism.
III.CUnemployment and Brexit
III.C.1Motivation
One of the quintessential examples of the rise of populism in Europe was the results on the UK
referendum on leaving the European Union (the so-called “Brexit vote”). The June 23 2016
referendum resulted in a majority (52%) of leaving the EU. There is no clear definition of the pro-
Brexit and anti-Brexit party alignment and this vote seems to have broken traditional party lines.
The ruling Conservative Party was split between “Leavers” and “Remainers”. The situation was
similar, though less stark in the Labour party. And while many politicians of the Labour Party were
active in the Remain campaign, its leader was lukewarm on remain and Brexit did well in
traditional labour electoral districts. We thus carry out a separate analysis of Brexit vote in an “out-
of-sample” fashion.  As in our earlier analysis at the EU level, we consider the relationship between
the Brexit vote outcomes in the UK’s 379 electoral districts and the change in unemployment in
these districts before and after the crisis23. Table 9 gives the results.
III.C.2OLS estimates
Table 9, column (1) shows the correlation between the Brexit vote share and unemployment rate in
2014 (both are expressed in percentage points). The coefficient at unemployment rate is marginally
significant; its magnitude is rather moderate. An increase in unemployment of one standard
deviation (2 percentage points) results in an increase of the “Leave vote” by 1 percentage point. The
share of variation explained by unemployment is tiny. In (2) we add dummies for Greater London,
Scotland and Wales – three major anti-Brexit macro regions (with England being the omitted macro
region). The magnitude and significance of the coefficient on unemployment increases. The
statistically significant (although economically small) relationship between unemployment and
23 Recent empirical studies examine the role of various socio-economic variables, such as unemployment, output,
immigration, and dependency on EU funds on BREXIT. See, among others, Los et al. (2016), Becker, Fetzer, and
Novy. (2017), Colantone and Stanig (2016), and Arnorsson and Zoega (2016).
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Brexit vote is consistent with the findings of Becker, Fetzer, and Novy (2017) thorough analysis of
the correlates of Brexit.
The relationship is much stronger for the change in unemployment before and after the
crisis. In columns (3) and (4) we report regressions where the independent variable is the difference
in the district’s unemployment rate averaged out over the 2008-14 and 2002-06 periods,
respectively. [Average increase in the unemployment in the UK electoral districts was 2 percentage
points.]. The results for the change in unemployment are much stronger than those for
unemployment level, a result consistent with our earlier findings. An increase in the unemployment
change by one standard deviation (one percentage point) results in 4-5 percentage points increase in
the Brexit vote. Unemployment performs stronger in changes than in levels in specifications where
both variables are included as independent variables (results available upon request). Figures 9a-b
provide an illustration. The relationship between unemployment and Brexit vote has a positive
slope, but the effect is weak and noisy. In contrast, the correlation between changes in
unemployment and Brexit vote is much steeper and more precisely estimated.
Figure 9a Figure 9b
III.C.32SLS estimates on the Brexit
In an effort to approximate the causal impact of the change in unemployment over the crisis on the
Brexit vote, we instrument the change in unemployment (over 2008-2014) with the pre-crisis share
of construction sector. To reduce noise and to smooth yearly fluctuations we average the share of
construction in districts’ employment for the period 2005-08 (the results are similar when we use
the 2007). Construction share is on average 9 percent, range from 3% to 15%. As shown in columns
(5)-(6), there is strong first-stage fit, as the pre-crisis share of construction is correlated with
changes in unemployment. A one standard variation in the pre-crisis share of construction (two
percentage points) accounts for 2.5-3 percentage point change in unemployment (a quarter or a third
of its standard deviation).
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The “reduced-form” relationship, reported in (7)-(9), is also significant. An increase of two
percentage points in the construction share is associated with 4-5 percentage point increase in the
Brexit vote (with and without socio-demographic district-level controls). Columns (10)-(12) report
2SLS coefficients. The change in regional unemployment instrumented by the pre-crisis share of
construction is highly significant correlate of BREXIR. The magnitude is large: each percentage
point of an increase in unemployment implies 12-18 percentage point increase in the Brexit vote.
IV. Unemployment, General and Political Trust, and Political Beliefs
We now examine the link between regional unemployment and trust, attitudes, and beliefs using the
European Social Survey data. The descriptive analysis (Section 3) revealed that at the European
level the large post-2008 increase in unemployment has been accompanied by a substantial rise in
distrust towards political institutions, although general (interpersonal) trust has not moved much. In
this section, we examine whether the economic and trust crises are related.
IV.A Approach and Specification
As before, we assess the impact of the economic crisis on trust and on others attitudes and beliefs,
employing two related approaches. First, using all ESS rounds we estimate panel fixed-effects spec-
ifications that account for all region-level time-invariant factors that affect trust (as well as other
beliefs and attitudes) and unemployment. This is key as the literature on the origins of trust and cul-
ture more generally, has established the importance of very slow changing local factors, including
geography (e.g., Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013), Buggle and Durante (2017)) and history
(Tabellini (2010), Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)). Second, we estimate difference specifications
that associate changes in trust-beliefs-attitudes with changes in unemployment before and after the
crisis24. Since most European countries recover from the recessions by 2012, we estimate the differ-
ence specifications using two alternative post-crisis periods: 2008-2014 and 2008-2012. We also
present the graphical before-after analysis, using average values for 2010, 2012, and 2014 for the
post-crisis period and average values from 2004, 2006, and 2008 for the pre-crisis periodW report
estimates across the full sample but we also comment on the results when we estimate the regres-
sions separately for the four country groups (North, Centre, East, and South).
IV.B OLS Estimates
Table 10 presents OLS panel fixed effects estimates. In Panel A we include ESS round dummies
and in Panel B we include country-group ESS round fixed effects to account for differential trends
24 Unfortunately, as the ESS database does not cover all countries in all rounds, we miss some important cases, such as
Italy and Greece.
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across the main European macro regions25. Table 11 reports difference specifications over the peri-
od 2008-2012 in Panel A and over period 2008-2014 in Panel B.26 These specifications include
country-group constants; since the model is expressed in differences, the country-group fixed ef-
fects account for differential time trend.
IV.B.1 General Trust
We start our analysis studying the association between regional unemployment and general inter-
personal trust. Table 10’s columns (1)-(3) report the panel estimates with the three measures of in-
terpersonal trust. The coefficients on unemployment are statistically significant in Panel A, though
they become more imprecise when we include country-group-time fixed effects. The estimate in
Panel B column (1), implies that a 10 percentage point increase in regional unemployment is asso-
ciated with a fall in overall trust of about 0.11, roughly one standard deviation (The standardized
“beta” is -0.065). The within-region association between unemployment and general trust is nega-
tive across all country groups; though it is significant only in East European countries and to a less-
er extent in the South (group-specific results are available upon request).
The before-after specifications in Table 11 hint that unemployment and general trust are to
some extent related. The 2008-2014 specifications yield significantly negative coefficients, though
the coefficients in the 2008-2014 difference specifications are smaller in absolute value and statisti-
cally insignificant. It seems that the significance is to some extent driven by Bulgaria and Slovakia,
where there is no link between unemployment and general trust. When we omit these two countries
from the 2014-2008 specifications so as to have the same sample in the two Panels the coefficient
on unemployment in columns (1), (2), and (3) becomes -0.147, -0.0288, and, -0.724, respectively.
The coefficient on regional unemployment is significant at the 10% level only in (3). Figures 10a-
10b illustrate the before-after correlation between general trust (and whether people are helpful) and
unemployment, when we pool all observations post crisis (2010, 2012, and 2014) and pre-crisis
(2004, 2006, and 2008). The slope of the regression line is small and statistically indistinguishable
from zero, pointing out that the link between regional unemployment and general trust is weak.
25 We have also estimated specifications with region fixed effects and country-year fixed effects that account for
differential trends on unemployment and trust. Yet, since there is not much variation on unemployment and beliefs
within countries in a given year, this approach yields in general noisy and much more attenuated coefficients.
26 Compared to the specifications in 2012-2008, in the 2014-2008 specifications we lose 4 regions from Slovakia and 6
regions from Bulgaria.
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Figure 10a Figure 10b
IV.B.2 Trust in Political Institutions
Given the impact of unemployment on voting for extremist parties, we examine its role on trust
towards political institutions. Columns (4)-(8) in Table 10 and Table 11 report the estimates.
Political Trust. Let us first consider the trust towards politicians and trust in the national parlia-
ment. The panel estimates in Table 10, Panel A, yield negative and highly significant coefficients,
showing a strong link between unemployment and political distrust. The coefficients drop by half
when we include ESS-round dummies, to account for Europe-wide and global trends, but they re-
tains statistical significance. This implies that while a sizable part of the negative association be-
tween unemployment and political trust stems from comparing countries in the Core with the
Southern and Eastern Europe, the link is present in all groups of countries. A 5 percentage point
increase in unemployment is associated with a 1.5 percentage point drop in political trust, a consid-
erable effect as the latter’s standard deviation is 11 percentage points (see Table 1). The standard-
ized “beta” coefficients are around -0.15, more than twice as large as the corresponding coefficients
with the proxies of general interpersonal trust. The specifications in Table 11 also yield highly sig-
nificant estimates. The spike in unemployment is accompanied by a sizable rise in political distrust.
Figures 10c-10d give a graphical illustration of the before-after patterns in regional unemployment
and political trust, when we average the variables over 2010-2014 (post-crisis) and over 2004-2008
(pre-crisis). The regression line is steep; and the correlation is present in all groups of countries.
32
Figure 10c Figure 10d
Trust towards the Legal System and the Police. The analysis further shows that unemployment is
also related to distrust towards the legal system (column (6)). The panel coefficient in Table 10’s
Panel A is highly significant. The coefficient decreases in magnitude and loses statistical signifi-
cance once we add country-group-time effects (in Panel B), suggesting that the link is driven by the
considerable variability between Core and Periphery countries. When we estimate separate models
in the various country groups, we get significantly negative estimates in Transition and Northern
countries (and positive but insignificant estimates in the Centre and the South). The difference spec-
ifications are not crystal-clear, as the coefficient at unemployment is negative and significant in the
2008-2012 model (130 regions in 17 countries), but is insignificant in the 2008-2014 specification
(119 regions in 14 countries). Overall, there seems to be a relationship between the severity of the
crisis and distrust towards the legal system, though this relationship is less strong than the one for
the distrust towards politicians. Figure 9e provides an illustration.
Figure 10e Figure 10f
In contrast to the link between the change in unemployment and the change in trust in the
legal system, there is no significant relationship between the intensity of the crisis and trust towards
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the police. This applies to both the panel (Table 10) and the difference (Table 11) specifications.
Figure 10f illustrates the post-pre crisis association between unemployment and trust towards the
police. The slope is negative, but the correlation is quite noisy.
IV.B.3 Trust towards the European Union
As shown in the earlier section, unemployment is related to the rise of Eurosceptic parties. In an
effort to shed light on the underlying forces, we use the ESS question on trust towards the European
Parliament as a proxy of the anti-EU sentiment. ESS also asks Europeans on their trust towards the
UN. As the UN is an institution of global–rather than European–governance, we use the trust in the
UN as a placebo for the impact of the crisis on the trust towards international institutions.
The estimates in column (8) of Table 10’s Panel A yield a negative within-region correlation
between unemployment and trust towards the European parliament (coefficient -0.33). In contrast
there is no systematic link between unemployment and trust towards the United Nations (column
(9)), implying that the estimates in column (8) do not capture an overall resentment on international
institutions, but an EU-specific effect. When we add the country-group-year dummies (in Panel B),
the coefficient becomes insignificant, as most of the variation comes from the different views on
European Parliament across the main European macro regions. The negative correlation between
regional unemployment and trust in the European Parliament is quite strong in Eastern European
countries, but is not significant in the Core and in the South (results not shown). The difference
specifications in Table 11 are similar; changes in trust towards the EU are strongly related to chang-
es in regional unemployment. There is no robust correlation between changes in unemployment and
changes in trust towards the United Nations. Figures 10g-10h illustrate these patterns when we pool
observations post- and pre-crisis, so as to maximize the sample. There is an evident negative rela-
tionship between changes in unemployment and changes in trust towards the EU, but not in the UN.
Figure 10g Figure 10h
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IV.B.4 Political Attitudes
To further understand Europeans’ reaction to the crisis, we also examine the within-region correla-
tion between unemployment and political attitudes and beliefs.
The specifications in column (10) shows that the regional unemployment is strongly corre-
lated with people’s dissatisfaction with the way democracy works. The standardized “beta” coeffi-
cient that quantifies the change in satisfaction with democracy to a one standard deviation increase
in unemployment is -0.26 (when one controls for country-group ESS Round Fixed-Effects), three to
four times larger than the corresponding “beta” for interpersonal trust. This pattern is present in all
country groups and is especially strong in the Core and former Transition economies (results not
reported). The specifications in Table 11 reveal an almost one-to-one link between changes in re-
gional unemployment and changes in satisfaction with democracy. Figure 10.i provides a graphical
illustration of the post-pre crisis association of satisfaction with democracy and unemployment. The
correlation is negative and present in all groups of countries.
ESS also asks respondents on their satisfaction with the government, the state of the econo-
my, and their life. These variables are correlated. Regional unemployment correlates strongly with
all these variables, and especially with dissatisfaction with the economy and with the government.
So the patterns shown in Tables 10 and 11 (and Figure 10i) do not necessarily imply that Europeans
residing in regions with high unemployment necessarily have “non-democratic beliefs”. Yet, there
seems to be a metastasis from economic disparity and dissatisfaction with the economy and the
government to a more general dissatisfaction with democracy and the inability of institutions to
protect people against economic risks during the crisis.
We then examine whether unemployment has moved people to the left or to the right of the
political spectrum. As shown in column (11), there is not much evidence of a relationship between
unemployment and self-reported left-right political orientation. This applies both in the panel and
the difference specifications. It is also illustrated in the before-after scatterplot in Figure 10j. This is
due to considerable heterogeneity across countries. In some countries, unemployment is related to a
significant move to the “right” (e.g., Poland and to a lesser extent France and Germany), while in
others, unemployment moves voters to the “left” (e.g., Portugal). We also examine related ques-
tions, where individuals are asked whether they support more redistribution or whether they priori-
tize security, again failing to detect robust patterns (results not shown for brevity).
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The specifications in column (12) show that the unemployment-distrust link reflects a feel-
ing of crisis-hit Europeans that no political party is close to them. This pattern is quite strong in the
Core countries (Central and Northern Europe) and in transition economies; interestingly, it is absent
in the South where people seem to align closely to far-left and far-right parties. The standardized
“beta” coefficient (-0.15) is implying an economic effect that is as strong as the one with distrust
towards politicians and the national parliament (though more noisy). The difference specifications
yield significant association in the period 2012-2008, though the coefficient turns insignificant over
2014-2008. Figure 10k graphs the association when we pool all post crisis ESS waves to construct
regional averages of closeness to political parties and unemployment and the ESS wave for 2006,
2006, and 2008 to calculate the pre-crisis mean. The before-after crisis correlation coefficient in this
sample that maximizes coverage in negative and highly significant.
We also examine the impact of unemployment on beliefs on the future of European integra-
tion using a question that reads: “Now thinking about the European Union, some say European uni-
fication should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on
the 0-10 scale (where higher numbers indicate that unification should go further and lower num-
bers indicating that unification has already gone too far, best describes your position?”. The coef-
ficient at unemployment is small and in significant. On average, changes in unemployment are re-
lated neither with the view that the EU has gone too far nor with attitudes that the EU unification
should proceed more aggressively. This non-result masks heterogeneity.  In the South, the correla-
tion is significantly positive: in response to the crisis, Southern Europeans hope for deeper integra-
tion. In contrast, in the North and in the Centre, the within-region correlation is negative and signif-
icant, pointing out that in more crisis-hit regions of the European Core, respondents believe that the
EU integration project has gone too far.  Figure 10l illustrates the overall weak and noisy before-
after association, stemming from heterogeneity across the main EU broad regions.
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IV.B.5 Attitudes towards immigrants.
We now examine whether unemployment has affected attitudes towards immigrants. This is im-
portant, since “safeguarding” the country from immigration is a crucial element of the populist
rhetoric across many non-mainstream EU parties, mostly of the far-right, that have risen in popu-
larity (for example Marine Le Pen’s Front National in France, UKIP in the UK, Golden Dawn in
Greece). Tables 12 and 13 report panel fixed-effects and before-after difference specifications. For
completeness, the Tables give results with all immigration-related ESS questions.
Let us start with the panel specifications in Table 12-Panel A. Unemployment and attitudes
towards immigration are only weakly correlated. The estimates in columns (1)-(3) yield a negative
within-region correlation between unemployment and respondents favoring immigration from peo-
ple of the same race/ethnic background as the majority of the country population (in (1)), of differ-
ent-than-the majority racial/ethnic group (in (2)), and from poor non-EU countries (in (3)). Interest-
ingly, there is a small “racial bias”, as the unemployment coefficients are larger in absolute value,
for immigrants from different than the majority ethnic/racial group and non-EU countries. Yet, the
coefficients are not statistically significant. The specification in column (4) uncovers a positive rela-
tionship between unemployment and European’s views that immigration has a negative impact on
the economy.  The standardized “beta” coefficient is -0.39. In contrast, specification (5) yields no
association between unemployment and respondents’ views on immigrants’ role in country’s cul-
tural life, suggesting that economic–rather than cultural–explanations are at play.
When we add the country-group-year dummies (in Panel B), the negative correlations be-
tween regional unemployment and attitudes towards immigration become statistically significant for
both preferences for protecting the country from immigrants and beliefs regarding their negative
impact on the economy. The standardized “beta” coefficient is around -0.2. Panel B further reveals
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the strong economic insecurity component of anti-immigration sentiment. The coefficient at the
regional unemployment is negative and highly significant in column (4) when Europeans are asked
to express their views on immigrants’ impact on the economy. The effect of the regional unem-
ployment is close to zero and statistically insignificant when the question is whether immigrants
contribute positively or negatively to country’s cultural life. A similar pattern emerges from the
before-after specifications in Table 13. Differences in regional unemployment during the crisis are
related to views that immigration harms country’s economic life, but are unrelated to views on im-
migrants’ role on cultural life. This suggests that the relationship between immigration and support
for populist parties is mainly fueled by economic factors. At the same time, these results are not
consistent with the hypothesis that the Great Recession resulted in a cultural backlash against im-
migrants. It seems that the link between unemployment and anti-immigration attitudes stems from
the recession that has affected primarily political distrust and to a lesser extent interpersonal trust.
IV.C Identifying Causal Effects
To approximate the causal effects of the crisis on trust-beliefs and account for endogeneity concerns
(related mostly to time-varying omitted variables and error-in-variables), we run 2SLS specifica-
tions. As in the previous section, we use the share of construction in regional value added as an “ex-
cluded instrument” in the panel specifications and the pre-crisis share of construction in the differ-
ence specifications. Tables 14 and 15 report 2SLS panel specifications and 2SLS difference specifi-
cations, respectively. In line with the previously established strong first-stage, the Kleibergen-Paap
F-statistics is 24 and 22.5 in the panel estimates and 32 and 27 in the difference specifications, well
above weak-instrument thresholds (e.g., Staiger and Stock (1997)).
IV.C.1 Interpersonal Trust
The 2SLS panel estimates in Panel A yield significant negative coefficients at regional unemploy-
ment. Interestingly, the estimates are quite similar to the OLS coefficients, suggesting that either
endogeneity is not a major concern or that upward sources of bias cancel with attenuation stemming
from (classical) error-in-variables. When we add country-group-specific time trends the coefficients
decline in absolute value and become statistically indistinguishable from zero. The 2SLS difference
specifications are again quite similar to the OLS estimates; the second stage coefficient at the
change in regional unemployment is negative, but statistically indistinguishable from zero in the
period 2008-2012, while it is passes significance confidence levels in 2008-2014.  So there is a
weak-to-moderate link between the component of regional unemployment stemming from regional
industrial composition, and the share of construction to general trust.
IV.C.2 Trust towards Political Institutions
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The 2SLS specifications linking the share of construction with unemployment and in turn with trust
towards politicians or the country’s parliament pointing to a causal link. The 2SLS coefficients are
negative and highly significant in all specifications. The estimates in Panel B imply that an increase
in regional unemployment of 5 percentage points (roughly one standard deviation)–stemming from
a relatively high share in construction–is associated with a 3.5 percentage points drop in trust to-
wards the country’s parliament (roughly a third of a standard deviation).  Again, 2SLS coefficients
are comparable to the corresponding OLS estimates. The 2SLS coefficient at the change in unem-
ployment is also highly significant in Table 15.
It is also interesting to check the “reduced-form” specifications (reported in Appendix Ta-
ble). These estimates show that regions with a high construction share experienced a sizable drop in
political trust during the crisis period. Figures 11.a-d below illustrate these patterns.
Figures 11a Figures 11b
The 2SLS panel and difference-in-difference specifications show that the intensity of the crisis has
affected not only trust towards the political institutions, but also the trust in the legal system – alt-
hough to a smaller extent. The 2SLS coefficient in column (6), Panel A of Table 14, is negative and
significant at the 5% confidence level. The coefficient’s magnitude (-0.65) is comparable, though
larger in absolute value, to the OLS panel specifications (-0.44). Once we add country-group-time
dummies (Panel B), the 2SLS coefficient becomes smaller (-0.30) and statistically insignificant –
exactly as in the respective OLS estimation. Yet, in the before-after specifications in Table 15
changes in unemployment (instrumented with the pre-crisis construction share) has a highly signifi-
cant negative effect on the trust in the legal system. Figures 11.e-f illustrate the significant “re-
duced-form” correlation between the pre-crisis construction share and the drop in trust towards the
country’s legal system during the crisis. In contrast to distrust to the legal system, the 2SLS analysis
establishes no systematic link between unemployment and the trust towards the police. The panel
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specifications yield insignificant second stage coefficients at unemployment when trust in the police
serves as the dependent variable. The same applies in the before-after 2SLS specifications that also
produce noisy and insignificant estimates. As Figures 11c-d show the “reduced-form” relationship
between the pre-crisis construction share and the change in trust in police is weak and noisy.
Figure 11c Figure 11d
IV.C.3 Trust towards the European Union
In columns (8) and (9) we examine the link between unemployment and trust towards the EU (more
specifically, trust in the European Parliament). The 2SLS coefficient at unemployment in the panel
specifications is negative and highly significant; its magnitude (-0.8) is considerably larger in abso-
lute value than the analogous OLS estimate (which was also more imprecise). The estimate implies
that a 5 percentage point construction-driven increase in regional unemployment is related to 4 per-
centage point drop in trust towards the European Parliament; this is a considerable effect, as it cor-
responds to 0.66-0.75 of a standard deviation. In contrast, there is no link between the construction
component of regional unemployment and trust towards the United Nations. The difference 2SLS
specifications yield similar patterns: a significant relationship between the changes in unemploy-
ment coming from the pre-crisis construction share and distrust towards the European Parliament.
The “reduced-form” scatterplots in Figures 11e-f illustrate these patterns.
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IV.C.4 Political Views
The 2SLS panel estimates show that unemployment is related to dissatisfaction with the functioning
of democracy in the country. The coefficients are large, implying considerable effects. Yet, we
should stress here (again) that unemployment is also related to dissatisfaction with the government
and economic uncertainty and a general feeling of dissatisfaction with life; these effects are strongly
correlated with each other. Hence it is hard to isolate the “pure” impact of unemployment on sup-
port for democratic institutions from these related issues.
The link between unemployment and left-right political self-orientation is again weak. The
2SLS coefficient on unemployment in the panel specifications that utilize information from all
countries and periods is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The before-after specifi-
cations are less clear; while the 2SLS coefficient is insignificant in the period 2008-2012, it turns
significant in 2008-2014, pointing out that perhaps the crisis is pushing individuals to the right.
The panel estimates further show that there is a relationship between construction-driven
unemployment and disconnect with the political system (column (12)). In contrast, the 2SLS coeffi-
cient on beliefs that European integration went too far are small, change sign, and never pass statis-
tical significance level thresholds.
IV.C.5 Attitudes and Beliefs on Immigration
Tables 16 and 17 report 2SLS panel and before-after difference estimates examining the role of
construction driven swings in unemployment on attitudes towards immigration. The 2SLS coeffi-
cients are all negative implying that unemployment is to some extent related to anti-immigration
attitudes. Yet, the only robust and statistically significant coefficient in the more efficient panel es-
timates is on the questions asking Europeans on their whether immigration is harmful for the econ-
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omy27. While we do find a strong causal impact of unemployment on beliefs that immigrants could
harm the economy and local jobs, there is no relationship with the perceived impact of immigrants
on the country’s cultural life. This result is at odds with the cultural backlash theory for explaining
the electoral fortunes of populist parties; on the contrary, these results imply the importance of eco-
nomic insecurity as the main driver of populism.
IV.D Heterogeneity
The micro structure of the ESS dataset allows for a finer examination of the role of the crisis on
beliefs, trust, and attitudes. We explore heterogeneity of the effect identified above in an effort to
shed light on the mechanisms at play. Studying heterogeneity is useful, as various conjectures have
been put forward to explain the rise of populist voting and the spike in political distrust. For exam-
ple, district-level demographics and educational features seem to correlate with political extremism
in the US and BREXIT vote (Autor et al. (2016, 2017) and Becker et al. (2017)). And the link be-
tween economic variables and beliefs is related to education (Foster and Frieden (2017)). We search
for potential heterogeneity of the effects of the crisis on trust and attitudes, moving to the individual
level (i.e., not using regional means by ESS survey) and running the specifications separately for
subsamples divided by gender, age, and education.
Table 18 presents panel OLS estimates linking regional unemployment with individual-level
responses on general trust (columns (1)-(3)), trust towards political institutions (column (4)-(9)),
and political beliefs (columns (10)-(13)). Table 19 reports panel estimates focusing on attitudes to-
wards immigration. In all specifications we include region (NUTS 2) fixed-effects and general ESS
round dummies. The standard errors are adjusted for two-way clustering: at the NUTS2 level so as
to account for serial correlation and at the country-year level to account for residual interrelations
across all individuals in a given country-round.28 Running the regressions at the individual level is
also useful to assess the robustness of the benchmarks OLS panel estimates to the inclusion of re-
spondent-level characteristics. Following Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) and Giuliano and
Spilimbergo (2013), we control for age, age squared, gender, add education fixed effects, religion
fixed effects, marital status and 51 occupation fixed effects. Panel A shows the results at the full
sample that covers more than 100,000 individuals. These serve as the baseline estimates. Not sur-
prisingly, the regressions in the full sample of respondents yield similar results to the regional level
analysis. Regional unemployment correlates strongly with distrust in national politicians, local par-
liament, and the legal system and the European Parliament. Respondents’ view on the future of the
27 The results are quite similar if we further control for the share of other than construction industries in regional value
added. See Appendix Tables 8 and 9.
28 This adjustment produces larger standard errors and more conservative inference as compared to clustering at the
region-year level or only at one dimension.
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EU is not related to unemployment. There is also a strong negative correlation between unemploy-
ment and satisfaction with democracy. Unemployment is also significantly related to the respond-
ents’ feelings that no party is close to them and–as documented earlier–not much linked to people’s
self-orientation on the political left-right axis. The only (small) difference compared to the regional
analysis is that now there seems to be a negative link between unemployment and general trust.
In Panel B we separate by gender. The panel estimates imply no substantial differences. The
coefficients are quite similar for male and female in all questions reported in Tables 18 and 19, the
exception being the question on political self-orientation. There is some evidence that in response to
rising regional unemployment women are moving slightly to the left of the political spectrum, a
finding consistent with works showing women’s higher than men sensitivity to social issues.
In Panel C we examine heterogeneity with regard to respondents’ age. We consider three
age groups: young (below 30 years), middle-age (31-60) and old (60 or older). These account for
14%, 52%, and 34% of the sample, respectively. We do not discover major differences on the im-
pact of the regional unemployment on political trust and political beliefs between age categories
(Table 18, columns (4)-(13)). Interestingly, there is heterogeneity on general trust (columns (1)-(3));
regional unemployment is unrelated to interpersonal trust in young cohorts. Young cohorts’ views
on immigrants are also not much affected by regional unemployment (Table 19).
In Panel D we distinguish between respondents with completed tertiary (college) and non-
college education. Examining heterogeneity across this dimension is useful, as the combination of
skilled-biased technical change (related to automation and computerization) and globalization (fall
in tariffs, offshoring, etc) has hurt low-skill workers in industrial countries (see Autor (2014)) and
seems to have contributed to voting for non-mainstream parties and candidates (Autor et al. (2016,
2017)). The correlation between regional unemployment and political distrust is uniformly strong
for both college and non-college graduates (columns (4)-(9)). The same applies to political beliefs
and attitudes (columns (10)-(13)). There is, however, heterogeneity in general trust (columns (1)-
(3)). On the one hand, the coefficients for the college-educated are small and in general statistically
indistinguishable from zero. On the other hand, the coefficient on the non-college graduates sample
is much larger in absolute value and more precisely estimated, pointing out that regional unem-
ployment does contribute to falling trust for the group of unskilled individuals.
IV.E Taking Stock
Taken together, the OLS and 2SLS results imply that economic factors do not affect generalized
trust as much as trust in political institutions – at least in the context of the European economic cri-
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sis.29 This finding is consistent with the argument that the generalized social trust has a moral com-
ponent inherited through education and socialization. In Uslaner's formulation, general trust is a
“moral commandment to treat people as if they were trustworthy”. Trust is a belief that others share
our fundamental values (Uslaner (2002)), and people extrapolate from their experiences with specif-
ic individuals or from their educational and cultural background to extend trust to groups of people
with similar characteristics. In contrast, the European economic crisis has deeply undermined trust
in political institutions at the national and European level. The fact that we do find a rise in distrust
towards the national and EU politicians (but not towards police and United Nations) suggests that
citizens have blamed the inability to address the rise in unemployment on the inefficient national
and European political institutions. This in turn has resulted in the rise of populist parties in Europe.
The relationship between unemployment and distrust in legal system is also alarming, as an inde-
pendent, impartial, and well-functioning legal-judicial system is a key pillar of modern capitalist
societies and democracies (Hayek (1960)), guaranteeing freedom (La Porta et al. (2004)) and pro-
moting development (La Porta et al. (2008)). These findings are also related to the large literature
studying the interplay and interconnections between income/growth and democracy30. While the
literature mostly focuses on cross-country comparisons between democracies and non-democracies,
our results (that come from established democracies) point out that, democracy, or at least satisfac-
tion with democracy, cannot survive without the belief that it delivers shared prosperity.
Finally, our results on the relationship between unemployment and attitudes to immigration
help to shed light on the relative importance of the economic and cultural drivers of populism. The
impact of unemployment on attitudes towards immigration is especially strong to voters’ economic
concerns. The crisis has shifted Europeans’ views on the impact of immigrants on the economy, an
effect that is especially strong for individuals without college degree that are perhaps affected the
most by the negative consequences of globalization and technological improvements.
V. Conclusion
V.A Summary of the results
In this paper, we connect the European economic crisis of 2008-2012 with the rise of anti-
establishment parties and the widespread decline in trust towards national and European political
institutions. Our analysis, that exploits within-region variation across 26 European countries that
29 Ananyev and Guriev (2015) find a substantial effect of the Great Recession on generalized social trust in Russia, a
country with very political institutions relative to the EU. This result is similar to the one documented by Dustmann et
al. (2017) who link the ratio of political to interpersonal trust to unemployment.
30 See for example Barro (1996), Persson and Tabellini (2006), Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), Acemoglu et al. (2017)
and Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) for the effect of democratization on growth and Barro (1999), Acemoglu et al.
(2008) and Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) for the reverse link between development and democracy. Acemoglu et
al. (2014) discuss the interplay between democracy, inequality, and fiscal policy.
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have been hit and weathered the Great Recession in a differential manner, reveals that the econom-
ic, political and trust crisis in Europe are interconnected.
In the first part of our analysis, we describe the evolution of regional unemployment, voting
for anti-establishment parties, general and political trust, and attitudes towards immigration before
and after the crisis. The increased voting share of radical left, far right nationalistic, populist and
Eurosceptic parties is accompanied by a notable decline in trust towards national institutions, politi-
cians, parliament, and legal system, growing dissatisfaction with the working of democracy and an
anti-EU sentiment. And while there is heterogeneity in voting for the far-left and far-right parties
across the EU, the decline in political trust applies in almost all countries. However, and in contrast
to the conventional wisdom, there is no rise of anti-immigration sentiment.
Second, we examine the role of the crisis, as manifested in the increase in regional unem-
ployment, on voting for anti-establishment parties and turnout, exploiting the considerable within-
region variation in the intensity and timing of the economic downturn. Within-region changes in
unemployment are related to voting for anti-establishment parties, and in particular parties with a
populist agenda (of either the far left or far right). The same patterns emerge once we conduct a pre-
crisis vs. post-crisis difference-in-differences analysis. To push on causation, we used the pre-crisis
share of construction in regional value added as an “instrument” for changes in unemployment dur-
ing the Great Recession in the before-after specifications and the share of construction in the panel
fixed-effects specifications. The share of construction, a labor intensive sector that played a key role
both in the build-up and the aftermath of the crisis across Europe (and the world), is a significant
correlate of regional unemployment. The 2SLS specifications show that the component of regional
unemployment explained by construction share is also a significant correlate of voting for extremist
parties. In contrast, unemployment and turnout are not significantly related.
In the third part, we use individual-level data from the European Social Surveys that meas-
ure Europeans’ general and political trust, political attitudes, and beliefs on immigration to under-
stand the underlying mechanisms. The increase of unemployment during the crisis has resulted in
lower trust in national and European political institutions as well as in a rising distrust in the legal
system. Interestingly, higher unemployment does not correlate with trust in the police. Unemploy-
ment is also strongly related with dissatisfaction on the working of democracy and a belief that no
party is close to respondents. The impact of increase in unemployment on interpersonal trust is
small and not always statistically significant. These patterns emerge from both panel fixed-effects
OLS and pre-vs.-post-crisis difference-in-differences specifications. Also, the 2SLS specifications
that use the pre-crisis share of construction as an instrument for change in unemployment also yield
significant estimates thus supporting a causal interpretation; the magnitudes in the OLS and 2SLS
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specifications are similar. These patterns imply that European voters have assigned the blame for
the crisis to the national political and legal system and to European institutions, which most likely
has in turn fueled the support for anti-establishment parties.
We also investigate the impact of the Great Recession (also instrumented by the pre-crises
structure of the regional economy) on the attitude towards immigrants. Our analysis demonstrates
that regions experiencing a larger increase in unemployment are more likely to reject immigrants on
an economic basis. Yet, there is no effect of the crisis on the culture-driven opposition to immigra-
tion.
V.B Policy Implications
Our results imply that the loss of confidence in national and European political institutions and the
rise of populism are strongly related to the effect of the crisis on jobs, and much less so to a cultural
backlash, as many commentators, academics, and policy-makers have argued. This immediately
leads to yet another rationale for the countercyclical macroeconomic policies preventing rising un-
employment. Even a temporary increase in unemployment may result in a political fallout, which in
turn would give rise to anti-market policies and would undermine long-term economic growth. In
this case, a cyclical downturn (accompanied by an unemployment spike) may have adverse long-
term impact.
The Great Recession coupled with the inability of European institutions and the indecisive-
ness of policy markets to cope with its devastating economic consequences, has led to a dramatic
decline in the confidence of citizens in political and even legal institutions, putting democracy at
risk. As the literature on culture and trust uncovers considerable inertia of large economic down-
turns (e.g., Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2013), Nagel and Malmendier (2011)), trust towards key
democratic institutions of modern capitalist economies, might well have been damaged persistently
for the generations, even after the economic recovery, especially among the young generations who
have increasingly turned to populist parties.
There are important lessons and policy implications from the European crisis. The first one
is the importance of reducing unemployment to restore confidence in democracy and trust in institu-
tions. What can the European countries and the European Union do to fight unemployment? The
most straightforward response is to implement growth-promoting policies. Besides supply-side in-
terventions in labor, capital, and product markets, such policies include pan-European counter-
cyclical fiscal policies. This entails revamping the EU budget, which remains dramatically small
(about 1% of EU GDP). If the EU budget is to remain small, it urgently needs to redirect its priori-
ties on research, innovation and public infrastructures to take the most of the presence of scale
economies and cross-border positive externalities in Europe. The next Multiannual Financial
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Framework (MFF), starting in 2018-19, goes into this direction by making employment and growth
top priorities. Yet EU growth policies are only one part of the solution to combat unemployment. In
most EU countries, high unemployment rates are concentrated among unskilled workers, who have
suffered the most from technological change, outsourcing, and global competition. The European
Union has created two funds within the EU budget, The European Social Fund and the Europe-
an Globalization Adjustment Fund, to help and retrain workers who lose their jobs. But education
and training remain mainly the responsibility of the member states that should substantially improve
the quality of their education and life-long learning and training systems.
Finally, national governments and the EU should move beyond economics. It is vital to pre-
serve trust and open-minded attitudes of their citizens that face increasing economic insecurity. As
culture and institutions are strongly interconnected (e.g., Alesina and Giuliano (2015) for a review
and Alesina, Algan, Cahuc, and Giuliano (2015) for an application to labor market institutions),
maintaining general and political trust is a sine qua non condition for much-need reform (see Bald-
win and Giavazzi (2015) for policy proposal from leading economists). If structural reforms and
training are key for fighting unemployment, their effect might take some time to become effec-
tive and they cannot be the only way to support trust in institutions in the short run. European coun-
tries should also preserve trust from their citizens with better social security and safety nets for
workers who are currently unemployed.31 Insufficient investment to cushion economic shocks
means that the trust of generations in political and legal institutions and democracy could be severe-
ly hampered for decades. Governments need the confidence of their citizens to successfully address
policy challenges and to convince the public about the necessity of certain–a priori unpopular–
policy choices. The loss of trust in political institutions might therefore explain the continuing eco-
nomic stagnation in Europe.
31 The importance of social safety nets by times of crisis is illustrated in Appendix Figure A2 that illustrates the strong
positive correlation between the change of trust in the European parliament before (2006-2008) and after (2012-14) the
financial crisis and the change of social benefits per capita at the country level during the same period. The same posi-
tive correlation holds with trust in national parliament and satisfaction with democracy. While this finding is only based
on cross-country variation (there are no comparable region-level data), it opens a new scope for research on public poli-
cy to protect trust and democracy in crisis times.
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Obs. mean median St. Dev. Obs. mean median St. Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unemployment 2004 0.09 0.07 0.054 2142 0.10 0.08 0.062
Log Real GDP p.c. 1962 9.87 9.97 0.464 1580 10.04 10.07 0.385
Share of Construction 1962 0.07 0.07 0.021 1427 0.06 0.06 0.018
Share of Agriculture (incl. Forestry, Fishing) 1953 0.04 0.03 0.036 1420 0.03 0.02 0.026
Share of Finance 1962 0.21 0.21 0.058 1427 0.22 0.23 0.058
Share of Commerce 1962 0.24 0.23 0.056 1427 0.23 0.22 0.053
Share of Government 1962 0.23 0.22 0.060 1427 0.25 0.24 0.067
Share of Industry (Manufacturing) 1953 0.22 0.22 0.083 1421 0.20 0.20 0.089
Voting Share of Anti-Establishment Parties 552 0.25 0.20 0.202 510 0.31 0.32 0.193
 - Radical Left Parties 552 0.07 0.04 0.096 510 0.10 0.05 0.124
 - Far Right Nationalistic Parties 552 0.07 0.02 0.106 510 0.10 0.07 0.135
 - Populist Parties 552 0.15 0.07 0.176 510 0.23 0.18 0.188
 - Anti-European and Separatist Parties 552 0.19 0.15 0.164 510 0.28 0.28 0.188
Participation Rate 543 0.70 0.74 0.136 431 0.67 0.68 0.131
Trust Other People 616 0.49 0.48 0.097 462 0.50 0.49 0.094
People Fair 616 0.55 0.56 0.091 462 0.56 0.56 0.088
People Helpful 616 0.47 0.47 0.099 462 0.49 0.49 0.093
Trust Country's Parliament 616 0.45 0.46 0.104 462 0.42 0.41 0.126
Trust Politicians 616 0.35 0.35 0.098 462 0.33 0.31 0.123
Trust Legal System 616 0.50 0.51 0.108 462 0.50 0.50 0.127
Trust Police 616 0.59 0.60 0.094 462 0.61 0.62 0.094
Satisfaction with Working of Democracy 616 0.46 0.46 0.065 462 0.42 0.43 0.073
Trust in European Parliament 616 0.53 0.52 0.074 462 0.51 0.51 0.085
Trust in the United Nations 616 0.53 0.53 0.108 462 0.52 0.50 0.125
Placement on Left-Right Scale 616 0.50 0.50 0.053 462 0.51 0.51 0.054
Feel Close to a Particular Party 616 0.49 0.50 0.138 462 0.47 0.48 0.145
European Unification Go Further 450 0.54 0.53 0.085 305 0.51 0.50 0.080
Homosexuals Should Live Free 616 0.69 0.72 0.108 462 0.74 0.77 0.118
Allow Immigrants of Same Race 616 0.59 0.59 0.096 462 0.61 0.61 0.101
Allow Immigrants of Different Race 616 0.51 0.51 0.105 462 0.53 0.54 0.118
Allow Immigrants from Poorer Countries 616 0.50 0.50 0.109 462 0.50 0.50 0.120
Immigrants are Good for Economy 616 0.49 0.49 0.072 462 0.49 0.49 0.082
Immigrants Improve Cultural Life 616 0.56 0.56 0.085 462 0.56 0.57 0.094
Immigrants Make Country a Better Place 616 0.48 0.48 0.076 462 0.50 0.51 0.087
Panel D. Beliefs on Immigration. European Social Survey
The Table reports summary statistics (mean, median, and standard deviation) for the main variables employed in the empirical analysis distinguishing
between the pre-crisis period (2000-2008) and the post-crisis period (2009-2017) at the regional level (EU NUTS-2). The Data Appendix gives detailed
variable sources and definitions.
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Pre Crisis Period (2000-2008) Post Crisis Period (2009-2017)
Panel A. Economic Variables. EUROSTAT
Panel B. Voting Variables. Country-Specific Sources
Panel C. General and Political Trust and Political Attitudes. European
Anti-Establishment
Parties (All Types)
Radical Left
Parties
Far-Right
Parties
Populist
Parties
Anti-European
Parties
Participation
Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment 1.0577** 0.5578* 0.1897 1.1438*** 1.0024*** -0.3219*
 (0.3810)  (0.2911)  (0.1777)  (0.3601)  (0.3326)  (0.1585)
standardized "beta" 0.321 0.317 0.093 0.370 0.335 -0.148
adj. R square 0.386 0.438 0.312 0.471 0.451 0.380
within R-squre 0.397 0.448 0.324 0.480 0.461 0.392
Unemployment 1.1386*** 0.8129** 0.2193 1.0960*** 0.9438** -0.4299**
 (0.3396)  (0.3434)  (0.2014)  (0.3532)  (0.3991)  (0.1675)
standardized "beta" 0.345 0.462 0.107 0.355 0.316 -0.198
adj. R square 0.319 0.157 0.136 0.386 0.397 0.239
within R-squre 0.322 0.161 0.140 0.388 0.399 0.242
Unemployment 0.9666** 0.443 0.5183** 0.9256** 0.5535 -0.4926**
 (0.4419)  (0.3978)  (0.2188)  (0.4164)  (0.4493)  (0.1969)
standardized "beta" 0.293 0.252 0.253 0.300 0.185 -0.227
adj. R square 0.333 0.353 0.270 0.399 0.429 0.372
within R-square 0.342 0.361 0.279 0.407 0.436 0.381
Countries 23 23 23 23 23 22
Regions 225 225 225 225 225 220
Observations 1020 1020 1020 1020 1020 932
The table reports panel (region) fixed-effects OLS estimates. All specifications include NUTS2 constants (coefficients not reported). Panel A
includes year constants (not reported). Panel B includes four period constants (not reported), corresponding to 2000-2004 (period 1), 2005-
2008 (period 2), 2009-2012 (period 3), and 2013-2017 (period 4). Panel C includes country-group period specific period effects (constants not
reported). Regional unemployment data come from Eurostat. Information on voting comes from various country-specific databases and the
classification of parties’ orientation is mostly based on the Chappell Hill Expert Survey. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions
and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% confidence level.
Table 2. Unemployment and Voting for Anti-Establishment Parties
Panel Fixed-Effects OLS Estimates. 2000-2017
Panel A. General Year Fixed-Effects
Panel B. General Period (4-year) Time Fixed-Effects
Panel C. Country-Group Period (4-year) Time Fixed-Effects
Anti-Establishment
Parties (All Types)
Radical Left
Parties
Far-Right
Parties
Populist
Parties
Anti-European
Parties
Participation
Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Difference Unemployment 1.1317*** 0.7445** 0.1112 1.0135*** 0.9280*** -0.3008*
 (0.2853)  (0.3282)  (0.2348)  (0.3311)  (0.2741)  (0.1732)
standardized "beta" 0.444 0.508 0.066 0.387 0.382 -0.314
adj. R square 0.194 0.255 0.000 0.146 0.142 0.095
Difference Unemployment 1.3379** 0.5305 0.7223** 0.9725** -0.034 -0.1579
 (0.5032)  (0.5126)  (0.3266)  (0.4373)  (0.3949)  (0.2605)
standardized "beta" 0.525 0.362 0.431 0.372 -0.014 -0.165
adj. R square 0.202 0.274 0.186 0.149 0.281 0.291
Countries 26 26 26 26 26 25
Regions 244 244 244 244 244 230
Table 3. Unemployment and Voting for Anti-Establishment Parties Before and After the Crisis
OLS Difference Specifications.
Post-Crisis Average [2017-2009] - Pre-Crisis Average [2000-2008]
Panel A. General Constant
Panel B. Country-Group Constants
The table reports cross-sectional OLS estimates where the main variables are expressed in differences.  The dependent variable is the change in
the voting before and after the crisis across EU NUTS-2 regions. The independent variable is the change in regional unemployment before and
after the crisis. For both the dependent and independent variable, we first take mean values over the period 2009-2017 [post-crisis] and over
the period 2000-2008 [pre-crisis] and then take the difference. Panel A includes also a constant term (not reported). Panel B includes four
macro-region constants for the North, South, Centre and East (not reported).  The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and
sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
confidence level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of Construction -1.6926*** -1.3108*** -1.0158*** -0.9331***
 (0.2951)  (0.2381)  (0.2885)  (0.2538)
adj. R square 0.453 0.537 0.586 0.625
within R-squre 0.455 0.540 0.594 0.632
Countries 22 22 22 22
Regions 228 227 228 227
Observations 3254 3245 3254 3245
Region Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes No No
Country-Group Year Fixed-Effects No No Yes Yes
Other Industrial Shares No Yes No Yes
Pre-Crisis Share of Construction [2007-2003] 1.2540*** 1.4874*** 0.6831** 0.6957***
 (0.3198)  (0.3408)  (0.2491)  (0.2259)
adj. R square 0.281 0.346 0.597 0.629
Countries 23 23 23 23
Observations/Regions 240 239 240 239
Country-Group Constants No No Yes Yes
Other Industrial Shares No Yes No Yes
Table 4. Construction Share in Regional Value Added and Unemployment Dynamics
Panel A. Panel Fixed-Effects OLS Specifications.
Dep. Var.: Unemployment
Panel B. Difference Specifications.
Dep. Var.: Difference in Unemployment [2016-2009]-[2008-2000]
The table reports panel (region) fixed-effects OLS estimates (in Panel A) and cross-sectional OLS estimates where the main variables are expressed
in differences (Panel B) examining the within-region correlation between unemployment and the share of construction in regional value added.  In
Panel A the dependent variable is regional unemployment and the main independent variable is the share of construction in regional value added.
Columns (1)-(2) include year fixed-effects and columns (3)-(4) include country-group year fixed-effects (constants not reported). Columns (2) and
(4) include as controls the share in regional value added of agriculture (incl. fishing, forestry and mining), trade, finance, and government services
(coefficients not reported). In Panel B the dependent variable is the change in regional unemployment before and after the crisis across EU NUTS-2
regions. We first take mean values over the period 2009-2017 [post-crisis] and over the period 2000-2008 [pre-crisis] and then take the difference.
The main independent variable is the share of construction in regional value added before the crisis (mean value 2004-2007). Columns (3)-(4)
include country-group constants (not reported). Columns (2) and (4) include as controls the pre-crisis share in regional value added of agriculture
(incl. fishing, forestry and mining), trade, finance, and government services, averaged over the period 2004-2008 (coefficients not reported). The
Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.
Anti-Establishment Radical Left Far-Right Populist Anti-European Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Construction Share -3.4478*** -0.9335*** -1.3602* -3.3494*** -2.5700*** 0.0781
 (0.7458)  (0.2922)  (0.6938)  (0.8093)  (0.7540)  (0.8350)
adj. R square 0.429 0.419 0.245 0.504 0.448 0.332
within R-squre 0.440 0.430 0.259 0.514 0.458 0.346
Construction Share -3.2610*** -1.4859*** -0.9179 -2.9779*** -2.4528*** 0.2554
 (0.6212)  (0.4541)  (0.6658)  (0.5905)  (0.7474)  (0.8615)
adj. R square 0.295 0.181 0.110 0.345 0.353 0.124
within R-squre 0.298 0.185 0.114 0.348 0.356 0.129
Construction Share -3.8660*** -1.7215** -1.3425** -3.2677*** -1.9555** -0.0296
 (0.9339)  (0.7749)  (0.4918)  (0.7271)  (0.8088)  (0.7333)
adj. R square 0.333 0.240 0.268 0.373 0.436 0.269
within R-squre 0.344 0.252 0.279 0.382 0.445 0.281
Countries 21 21 21 21 21 20
Regions 213 213 213 213 213 211
Observations 834 834 834 834 834 791
The table reports panel (region) fixed-effects OLS estimates, illustrating the “reduced-form” association between voting for anti-establishment parties (and
electoral turnout) and the share of construction in regional value added. All specifications include NUTS2 constants (coefficients not reported). Panel A
includes year constants (not reported). Panel B includes four period constants (not reported), corresponding to 2000-2004 (period 1), 2005-2008 (period
2), 2009-2012 (period 3), and 2013-2017 (period 4). Panel C includes country-group specific period effects (constants not reported), allowing the four
period constants to differ across for main European regions (North, South, East, and Centre). Industrial share data come from Eurostat. Information on
voting comes from various country-specific databases and the classification of parties’ orientation is mostly based on the Chappell Hill Expert Survey. The
Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.
Table 5. Construction and Voting for Extremist Parties
Panel A. General Year Fixed-Effects
Panel B. General Period (4-year) Time Fixed-Effects
Panel C. Country-Group Period (4-year) Time Fixed-Effects
Anti-Establishment
Parties (All Types)
Radical
Left Parties
Far-Right
Parties
Populist
Parties
Anti-European
Parties
Participation
Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial Construction Share 1.5336** 1.5267** -0.4981 1.3688 0.8393 -0.3304
 (0.7105)  (0.6016)  (0.4857)  (0.8956)  (0.6381)  (0.2991)
adj. R square 0.066 0.189 0.011 0.045 0.019 0.018
Construction Share 1.4367 0.989 0.2007 1.067 -0.5533 0.1153
 (0.8891)  (0.8028)  (0.6172)  (0.8480)  (0.6179)  (0.2927)
adj. R square 0.139 0.272 0.137 0.108 0.310 0.271
Regions 23 23 23 23 23 22
Observations 228 228 228 228 228 212
Table 6. Pre-Crisis Construction Share and Changes in Voting for Anti-Establishment Parties
"Reduced-Form" Estimates
Panel A. General Constnat
Panel B. Country-Group Constants
The table reports cross-sectional OLS estimates, illustrating the “reduced-form” association between changes in voting for anti-establishment parties
(and electoral turnout) during the crisis and the pre-crisis share of construction in regional value added. In both panels the dependent variable is the
change in voting for anti-establishment political parties and turnout before and after the crisis across EU NUTS-2 regions. The independent variable is
the share of construction in regional value added before the crisis, average value over 2004-2007. Panel A includes also a constant term (not reported).
Panel B includes four macro-region constants for the North, South, Centre and East (not reported).  The Data Appendix gives detailed variable
definitions and sources.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% confidence level.
Anti-Establishment
Parties (All Types)
Radical Left
Parties
Far-Right
Parties
Populist
Parties
Anti-European
Parties
Participation
Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment 2.1985*** 1.0018*** 0.6188 2.0077*** 1.6536*** -0.5625
 (0.5384)  (0.2459)  (0.5199)  (0.5291)  (0.6306)  (0.5110)
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 27.12 27.12 27.12 27.12 27.12 20.53
Other Industrial Shares No No No No No No
Unemployment 2.7912*** 1.2676*** 0.5672 2.3517*** 1.7693** -0.5625
 (0.8951)  (0.4140)  (0.5820)  (0.7047)  (0.8089)  (0.5110)
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 20.85 20.85 20.85 20.85 20.85 20.53
Other Industrial Shares Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment 3.9991*** 1.7808*** 1.3887** 3.3802*** 2.0228** 0.0299
 (0.9872)  (0.5976)  (0.6054)  (0.8856)  (1.0291)  (0.7235)
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.55 14.28
Other Industrial Shares No No No No No No
Unemployment 4.1977*** 2.0680*** 1.2332** 3.2930*** 1.9654** -0.2861
 (1.0450)  (0.6971)  (0.4939)  (0.8041)  (0.8719)  (0.5592)
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 16.644 16.644 16.644 16.644 16.644 16.258
Other Industrial Shares Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 19
Regions 206 206 206 206 206 195
Observations 827 827 827 827 827 775
The table reports panel (region) fixed-effects 2SLS (two-stage-least-squares) estimates.  The first-stage associates regional unemployment with the
share of construction in regional value added. The second-stage associates voting for anti-establishment political parties (and turnout) to
“instrumented” by the construction share regional unemployment. All specifications include NUTS2 constants (coefficients not reported). Panels
A and B include four period constants (not reported), corresponding to 2000-2004 (period 1), 2005-2008 (period 2), 2009-2012 (period 3), and
2013-2017 (period 4). Panels C and D include country-group specific period effects (constants not reported), allowing the four period constants to
differ across for main European regions (North, South, East, and Centre).  Industrial share data come from Eurostat. The specifications in Panels B
and D include as controls the  share in regional value added of agriculture (incl. fishing, forestry and mining), trade, finance, and government services
(coefficients not reported). Information on voting comes from various country-specific databases and the classification of parties’ orientation is
mostly based on the Chappell Hill Expert Survey. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted
for clustering at the country-level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.
Table 7. Construction, Unemployment and Voting for Anti-Establishment Parties
Panel 2SLS Estimates. 2000-2017
Panel A. General Period Fixed-Effects. No Controls
Panel B. General Period Fixed-Effects. Industrial Shares Controls
Panel C. Country-Group Period (4-year) Time Fixed-Effects
Panel D. Country-Group Period (4-year) Time Fixed-Effects
Anti-Establishment
Parties (All Types)
Radical Left
Parties
Far-Right
Parties
Populist
Parties
Anti-European
Parties
Participation
Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Difference Unemployment 1.1964*** 1.1926*** -0.3902 1.0674** 0.6537 -0.2551
 (0.3797)  (0.3976)  (0.3784)  (0.5135)  (0.4388)  (0.2370)
Cragg Donald F-Stat 92.01 92.01 92.01 92.01 92.01 87.99
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 16.28 16.28 16.28 16.28 16.28 17.04
Difference Unemployment 2.0594** 1.4157* 0.2894 1.5304 -0.7899 0.1619
 (0.8502)  (0.7995)  (0.8109)  (0.9949)  (0.7525)  (0.4088)
Cragg Donald F-Stat 35.374 35.374 35.374 35.374 35.374 34.018
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 7.86 7.86 7.86 7.86 7.86 8.12
Countries 226 226 226 226 226 212
Regions 23 23 23 23 23 22
Table 8. Unemployment and Voting for Anti-Establishment Parties Before and After the Crisis
2SLS Difference Specifications.
Post-Crisis Average [2017-2009] - Pre-Crisis Average [2001-2008]
Panel A. General Constant
Panel B. Country-Group Constants
The table reports cross-sectional 2SLS (two-stage-least-squares) estimates. The first-stage associates changes in regional unemployment
before and after the crisis with the pre-crisis share of construction in regional value added. The second-stage associates changes in voting for
anti-establishment political parties (and turnout) to “instrumented” by the pre-crisis construction share changes in regional unemployment.
The post-crisis values for voting and unemployment are averages over 2009-2017 and the pre-crisis values are averages over 2001-2008.
Panel A includes also a constant term (not reported). Panel B includes four macro-region constants for the North, South, Centre and East (not
reported).  The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Unemployment [2014] 0.50* 1.35***
(0.30) (0.23)
Changes in Unemployment 5.48*** 4.31*** 15.48*** 17.35*** 12.00***
[2007-2014] (0.45) (0.43) (2.04) (2.76) (1.44)
Pre-Crisis Construction Share 0.16*** 0.12*** 2.44*** 2.16*** 1.90***
[2005-2008] (0.03) (0.03) (0.28) (0.24) (0.22)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
adj. R square 0.01 0.43 0.29 0.53 0.08 0.17 0.19 0.52 0.56 -0.69 -0.93 0.41
Regions 379 379 379 379 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370
First-Stage F-statistic 32.5 23.3 52.0
The table reports OLS and 2SLS across electoral district specifications examining the role of unemployment (in 2014), changes in unemployment (over 2008-2014), and the pre-crisis share of
construction in the share of the vote to leave from the European Union (BREXIT). The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) and (7)-(12) is the vote share for BREXIT in the June 2016
referendum. The dependent variable in columns (5)-(6) is changes in unemployment over the period 2014-2008. The specifications in even-numbered columns include as controls log population,
male/female ration, median age, urbanization rate, share of whites in total population, and dummy variables for districts in Greater London, Scotland, and Wales. Standard errors adjusted for
heteroscedasticity are reported below the point estimates. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.
Table 9. Unemployment, Crisis-Related Changes in Unemployment and BREXIT Vote
OLS Estimates
Leave the EU Votte Change in
Unemploymennt
Leave the EU Vote
General
Trust
People
Fair
People
Helpful
Trust
Parliament
Trust
Politicians
Trust
Legal
Trust
Police
Trust Eur.
Parliament
Trust
UN
Satisf.
Democ
Left-
Right
Feel Close
to a Party
Further
Unification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Unemployment -0.1867** -0.0941* -0.1629*** -0.6845*** -0.5903*** -0.4431*** -0.0393 -0.3337*** -0.0233 -0.9532*** -0.0654 -0.3975* 0.1058
 (0.0669)  (0.0567)  (0.0570)  (0.1504)  (0.1819)  (0.0916)  (0.0638)  (0.1137)  (0.0846)  (0.1466)  (0.0838)  (0.1992)  (0.1983)
stand. "beta" -0.107 -0.057 -0.091 -0.324 -0.293 -0.208 -0.023 -0.248 -0.016 -0.450 -0.065 -0.153 0.067
adj. R square 0.851 0.855 0.849 0.759 0.807 0.807 0.803 0.449 0.656 0.744 0.652 0.655 0.689
within R-squre 0.0806 0.0297 0.1001 0.2426 0.2427 0.1068 0.0684 0.233 0.1088 0.2636 0.0262 0.0497 0.1549
Unemployment -0.1142* -0.1212* -0.0346 -0.3027** -0.3025*** -0.1087 0.1229 -0.0645 0.0516 -0.5500*** 0.1210 -0.4638* -0.1632
 (0.0668)  (0.0710)  (0.0728)  (0.1395)  (0.0788)  (0.1411)  (0.1324)  (0.1591)  (0.1277)  (0.1371)  (0.0728)  (0.2725)  (0.1288)
stand. "beta" -0.065 -0.074 -0.019 -0.150 -0.143 -0.051 0.165 -0.05 0.04 -0.26 0.12 -0.18 -0.10
adj. R square 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.83 0.86 0.85 0.82 0.59 0.69 0.81 0.68 0.71 0.742
within R-square 0.123 0.0513 0.1431 0.4611 0.4693 0.3103 0.0712 0.4392 0.2198 0.4642 0.1179 0.2281 0.3188
Countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 20
Regions 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 154
Observations 1051 1051 1051 1051 1051 1051 1051 1051 1051 1051 1051 1051 709
Table 10: Unemployment, General and Political Trust, and Political Beliefs
Panel Fixed-Effects OLS Estimates. 2000-2014
Panel A. General ESS Round (Time) Fixed-Effects
Panel B. Country-Group ESS Round (Time) Fixed-Effects
The table reports panel (region) fixed-effects OLS estimates, associating general interpersonal trust, trust towards institutions, and political beliefs with regional unemployment. All specifications
include NUTS2 constants (coefficients not reported). Panel A includes ESS Round (time) constants (not reported). Panel B includes country-group ESS Round (time) fixed effects (constants not
reported), allowing the ESS Round (time) constants to differ across for main European regions (North, South, East, and Centre). Regional unemployment data come from Eurostat. Information on trust
and beliefs come from the European Social Surveys (ESS). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.
General
Trust
People
Fair
People
Helpful
Trust
Parliamen
Trust
Politicians
Trust
Legal
Trust
Police
Trust Eur.
Parliament
Trust
UN
Satisf.
Democ
Left-
Right
Feel Close
to a Party
Further
Unification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Unemployment -0.0537 0.0251 -0.0765 -0.6484* -0.7317*** -0.3795** -0.122 -0.4369** 0.023 -0.7502* 0.1174 0.22 -0.1812
 (0.1442)  (0.1171)  (0.2018)  (0.3180)  (0.2427)  (0.1765)  (0.1639)  (0.1548)  (0.1287)  (0.4289)  (0.1947)  (0.4698)  (0.4073)
adj. R square 0.011 0.002 0.028 0.459 0.463 0.270 0.111 0.293 0.060 0.526 0.070 0.094 0.217
Regions 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142
Countries 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Unemployment -0.2740** -0.1453 -0.4597**-0.9481***-0.9270*** -0.1973 0.0114 -0.2814* 0.271 -1.0191***0.2556*** -0.5944 -0.2234
 (0.0993)  (0.1465)  (0.1622)  (0.2491)  (0.1944)  (0.1902)  (0.2417)  (0.1575)  (0.1744)  (0.2170)  (0.0332)  (0.5690)  (0.3150)
adj. R square 0.11 0.045 0.128 0.432 0.376 0.141 0.051 0.25 0.025 0.53 0.081 0.074 0.161
Regions 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Table 11: Unemployment, General and Political Trust, and Political Beliefs before and after the Economic Crisis
Difference OLS Estimates
Panel A. 2012-2008
Panel B. 2014-2008
The table reports cross-sectional OLS estimates, associating general interpersonal trust, trust towards institutions, and political beliefs with regional unemployment in before-after crisis
differences.  The dependent variable is the change in the various trust and beliefs variables over 2012-2008 in Panel A and over 2014-2008 in Panel B. The independent variable is the change in
regional unemployment over 2012-2008 in Panel A and over 2014-2008 in Panel B. All specifications in both panels include macro-region constants for the North, South, Centre and East (not
reported).  The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.
Majority
Race/Ethnic
Group
Different
Race/Ethnic
Group
Poor Non-
EU
Countries
Economy Cultural
Life
Country
Better/Worse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment -0.1627 -0.2562 -0.2714 -0.5554*** -0.0441 -0.1767*
 (0.1945)  (0.1661)  (0.1953)  (0.0800)  (0.0770)  (0.0907)
standardized "beta" -0.088 -0.123 -0.127 -0.390 -0.026 -0.116
adj. R square 0.047 0.081 0.048 0.195 0.049 0.075
within R-squre 0.054 0.088 0.054 0.201 0.056 0.081
Unemployment -0.3547* -0.3973** -0.4582** -0.5226*** -0.0656 -0.1075
 (0.1913)  (0.1858)  (0.1928)  (0.1416)  (0.0773)  (0.1402)
standardized "beta" -0.193 -0.191 -0.214 -0.367 -0.039 -0.071
adj. R square 0.178 0.199 0.133 0.280 0.082 0.130
within R-square 0.198 0.218 0.153 0.297 0.104 0.151
Countries 22 22 22 22 22 22
Regions 184 184 184 184 184 184
Observations 1053 1053 1053 1053 1053 1053
The table reports panel (region) fixed-effects OLS estimates, associating beliefs and attitudes towards immigrants with regional
unemployment. All specifications include NUTS2 constants (coefficients not reported). Panel A includes ESS Round (time) constants
(not reported). Panel B includes country-group ESS Round (time) fixed effects (constants not reported), allowing the ESS Round (time)
constants to differ across for main European regions (North, South, East, and Centre). Regional unemployment data come from Eurostat.
Information on attitudes and beliefs towards immigration come from the European Social Surveys (ESS). The Data Appendix gives
detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.
Table 12. Unemployment and Beliefs on Immigration
Panel Fixed-Effects OLS Estimates. 2000-2014
Allow Immigrants Immigrants' Role
Panel A. General ESS Round (Time) Fixed-Effects
Panel B. Country-Group ESS Round (Time) Fixed-Effects
Majority
Race/Ethnic
Group
Different
Race/Ethnic Group
Poor Non-
EU Countries Economy
Cultural
Life
Country
Better/Worse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment 0.0893 -0.1668 -0.052 -0.3245 0.232 0.0565
 (0.3928)  (0.3252)  (0.3599)  (0.3492)  (0.3207)  (0.2648)
adj. R square 0.198 0.033 0.022 0.077 -0.017 0.009
Regions 142 142 142 142 142 142
Countries 17 17 17 17 17 17
Unemployment -0.5318*** -0.5870*** -0.6671*** -0.7716*** 0.0199 -0.2486*
 (0.1760)  (0.1492)  (0.1799)  (0.2249)  (0.1748)  (0.1359)
adj. R square 0.378 0.241 0.169 0.285 0.025 0.112
Regions 132 132 132 132 132 132
Countries 15 15 15 15 15 15
The table reports cross-sectional OLS estimates, associating beliefs and attitudes towards immigrants with regional unemployment in before-after
crisis differences.  The dependent variable is the change in attitudes - beliefs variables over 2012-2008 in Panel A and over 2014-2008 in Panel B.
The independent variable is the change in regional unemployment over 2012-2008 in Panel A and over 2014-2008 in Panel B. All specifications in
both panels include macro-region constants for the North, South, Centre and East (not reported).  The Data Appendix gives detailed variable
definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% confidence level.
Table 13. Unemployment and Beliefs on Immigration before and after the Economic Crisis
Difference OLS Estimates
Allow Immigrants Immigrants' Role
Panel A. 2012-2008
Panel B. 2014-2008
General
Trust
People
Fair
People
Helpful
Trust
Parliamen
Trust
Politicians
Trust
Legal
Trust
Police
Trust Eur.
Parliamen
Trust
UN
Satisf.
Democ
Left-
Right
Feel Close
to a Party
Further
Unification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Unemployment-0.2346*** -0.0972* -0.2109***-1.1344***-0.9429***-0.6512*** -0.1527 -0.8074** -0.2257 -1.4496*** -0.1774 -0.8715* 0.1753
 (0.0879)  (0.0516)  (0.0480)  (0.2967)  (0.2331)  (0.1889)  (0.2135)  (0.3405)  (0.1795)  (0.3700)  (0.1113)  (0.5226)  (0.2225)
F-Stat 24.10 24.10 24.10 24.10 24.10 24.10 24.10 24.10 24.10 24.10 24.10 24.10 55.06
Unemployment -0.1592 -0.1639 -0.0837 -0.7258** -0.6060** -0.3026 -0.0663 -0.8261** -0.2769 -1.2145*** -0.0338 -1.4469*** -0.0339
 (0.1458)  (0.1213)  (0.1241)  (0.3382)  (0.2555)  (0.2237)  (0.2431)  (0.3699)  (0.1995)  (0.3729)  (0.1207)  (0.4901)  (0.2332)
F-Stat 22.52 22.52 22.52 22.52 22.52 22.52 22.52 22.52 22.52 22.52 22.52 22.52 27.91
Controls No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 18
Observations 969 969 969 969 969 969 969 969 969 969 969 969 651
Table 14. Unemployment, General and Political Trust, and Political Beliefs
Panel Fixed-Effects 2SLS Estimates. 2000-2014
Panel A. General ESS Round (Time) Fixed-Effects
Panel B. Country-Group ESS Round (Time) Fixed-Effects
The table reports panel (region) fixed-effects 2SLS (two-stage-least-squares) estimates.  The first-stage associates regional unemployment with the share of construction in regional value added. The
second-stage associates general trust, trust towards institutions, and political attitudes to “instrumented” by the construction share regional unemployment. All specifications include NUTS2
constants (coefficients not reported). Panel A includes ESS Round (time) constants (not reported). Panel B includes country-group ESS Round (time) fixed effects (constants not reported), allowing
the ESS Round (time) constants to differ across for main European regions (North, South, East, and Centre). Regional unemployment data and data on construction share come from Eurostat.
Information on trust and beliefs come from the European Social Surveys (ESS). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the
country-level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.
General
Trust
People
Fair
People
Helpful
Trust
Parliamen
Trust
Politicians
Trust
Legal
Trust
Police
Trust Eur.
Parliament
Trust
UN
Satisf.
Democ
Left-Right
Orientat.
Feel Close to
a Party
Further
Unification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Unemployment -0.2685 0.2171 -0.1482 -1.7279***-1.9117*** -1.2490** -0.658 -0.8309* -0.1762 -1.7173** 0.3446 0.3904 0.3637
 (0.3249)  (0.3403)  (0.2352)  (0.6705)  (0.6086)  (0.5344)  (0.4539)  (0.4925)  (0.4433)  (0.8446)  (0.2363)  (0.4409)  (0.8334)
F-Stat 31.82 31.82 31.82 31.82 31.82 31.82 31.82 31.82 31.82 31.82 31.82 31.82 31.82
Observations 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130
Countries 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Unemployment-0.6679***-0.6561***-0.7960***-2.1427***-2.0174*** -1.0658** -0.5708 -1.7362** -1.2131**-1.8365*** 0.6541** -0.9638 -0.4132
 (0.1896)  (0.1213)  (0.2427)  (0.6024)  (0.5622)  (0.4207)  (0.4368)  (0.7267)  (0.5715)  (0.5414)  (0.2581)  (0.7062)  (0.5918)
F-Stat 27.09 27.09 27.09 27.09 27.09 27.09 27.09 27.09 27.09 27.09 27.09 27.09 27.09
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119
Countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
The table reports cross-sectional 2SLS (two-stage-least-squares) estimates. The first-stage associates changes in regional unemployment before and after the crisis with the pre-crisis share of
construction in regional value added. The second-stage associates changes in general trust, trust towards institutions, and political attitudes to “instrumented” by the pre-crisis construction share
changes in regional unemployment.  Panel A gives difference estimates over the period 2012-2008. Panel B gives difference estimates over the period 2014-2008. All specifications (in both panels)
include macro-region constants for the North, South, Centre and East (not reported). ). Regional unemployment data and data on construction share come from Eurostat. Information on trust and
beliefs come from the European Social Surveys (ESS).  The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.
Table 15. Unemployment, General and Political Trust, and Political Beliefs before and after the Economic Crisis
Difference 2SLS Difference Estimates
Panel A. 2012-2008
Panel A. 2014-2008
Majority
Race/Ethnic Group
Different
Race/Ethnic
Group
Poor Non-
EU
Countries
Economy Cultural
Life
Country
Better/Worse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment -0.0448 -0.2492 -0.267 -0.6348*** -0.0777 -0.2074
 (0.2307)  (0.2386)  (0.2775)  (0.1849)  (0.1484)  (0.1431)
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 24.10 24.10 24.10 24.10 24.10 24.10
Unemployment -0.239 -0.4248 -0.5621* -0.6405** -0.2635 -0.145
 (0.3334)  (0.2982)  (0.3135)  (0.3183)  (0.2356)  (0.2176)
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 22.52 22.52 22.52 22.52 22.52 22.52
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20
Regions 174 174 174 174 174 174
Observations 969 969 969 969 969 969
The table reports panel (region) fixed-effects 2SLS (two-stage-least-squares) estimates.  The first-stage associates regional unemployment with
the share of construction in regional value added. The second-stage associates attitudes towards immigration to “instrumented” by the
construction share regional unemployment. All specifications include NUTS2 constants (coefficients not reported). Panel A includes ESS
Round (time) constants (not reported). Panel B includes country-group ESS Round (time) fixed effects (constants not reported), allowing the
ESS Round (time) constants to differ across for main European regions (North, South, East, and Centre). Regional unemployment data and data
on construction share come from Eurostat. Information on beliefs-attitudes towards immigration comes from the European Social Surveys
(ESS). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.
Table 16. Unemployment and Beliefs on Immigration
Panel Fixed-Effects 2SLS Estimates. 2000-2014
Allow Immigrants Immigrants' Role
Panel A. General ESS Round (Time) Fixed-Effects
Panel B. Country-Group ESS Round (Time) Fixed-Effects
Majority
Race/Ethnic Group
Different
Race/Ethnic Group
Poor Non-
EU Countries Economy Cultural Life
Country
Better/Worse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment 1.1474** 0.1163 0.1941 -0.3464 0.3335 -0.1047
 (0.5244)  (0.6470)  (0.7574)  (0.6385)  (0.6962)  (0.5759)
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 31.82 31.82 31.82 31.82 31.82 31.82
Regions 130 130 130 130 130 130
Countries 17 17 17 17 17 17
Unemployment -0.6863*** -1.2291*** -1.6126*** -0.9253** -0.2176 -0.4651*
 (0.2627)  (0.3055)  (0.4993)  (0.3918)  (0.3637)  (0.2635)
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 27.09 27.09 27.09 27.09 27.09 27.09
Regions 119 119 119 119 119 119
Countries 14 14 14 14 14 1413 13 13 13 13 13
The table reports cross-sectional 2SLS (two-stage-least-squares) estimates. The first-stage associates changes in regional unemployment before and
after the crisis with the pre-crisis share of construction in regional value added. The second-stage associates changes in attitudes towards
immigration to “instrumented” by the pre-crisis construction share changes in regional unemployment.  Panel A gives difference estimates over the
period 2012-2008. Panel B gives difference estimates over the period 2014-2008. All specifications (in both panels) include macro-region constants
for the North, South, Centre and East (not reported). ). Regional unemployment data and data on construction share come from Eurostat.
Information on beliefs-attitudes towards immigration comes from the European Social Surveys (ESS).  The Data Appendix gives detailed variable
definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% confidence level.
Table 17. Unemployment and Beliefs on Immigration before and after the Economic Crisis
Difference 2SLS Estimates
Allow Immigrants Immigrants' Role
Panel A. 2012-2008
Panel B. 2014-2008
General
Trust
People
Fair
People
Helpful
Trust
Parliament
Trust
Politicians
Trust Legal
System
Trust
Police
Trust Eur.
Parliament
Trust
UN
Satisf.
Democ
Left-Right
Orientat.
Feel Close
to a Party
Further
Unification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Unemployment -0.3015***-0.1672***-0.2474** -0.8248*** -0.6811*** -0.4909*** -0.1648* -0.5454*** -0.1506 -0.9546*** -0.0772 -1.1357*** -0.158
(-3.32) (-2.87) (-2.52) (-4.41) (-4.25) (-3.77) (-1.83) (-3.70) (-1.32) (-5.53) (-1.01) (-4.44) (-0.85)
Observations 103875 103448 103671 101481 102392 101509 103055 92932 93177 100605 90877 102237 61437
Unemployment -0.3255***-0.1698***-0.2672***-0.8552*** -0.6950*** -0.5590*** -0.1802 -0.5422*** -0.1286 -0.9752*** 0.0044 -0.9691*** -0.117
(-3.45) (-2.85) (-2.70) (-4.51) (-4.29) (-3.98) (-1.66) (-3.65) (-1.15) (-5.41)  (0.0600) (-3.63) (-0.60)
46780 46626 46693 46133 46352 46154 46601 43072 43560 45987 42148 46155 28391
Unemployment -0.2718***-0.1621** -0.2272** -0.7986*** -0.6654*** -0.4263*** -0.1483* -0.5509*** -0.1748 -0.9333*** -0.1574** -1.2896*** -0.193
(-2.92) (-2.48) (-2.24) (-4.31) (-4.14) (-3.48) (-1.86) (-3.68) (-1.45) (-5.55) (-2.01) (-5.15) (-1.06)
Observations 57040 56767 56923 55295 55986 55303 56401 49815 49571 54569 48683 56029 33015
Unemployment -0.1137 -0.0336 -0.1055 -0.5535** -0.4431** -0.4590*** -0.1373 -0.4120** -0.1445 -0.7994*** -0.0607 -0.9867*** -0.1056
(-1.27) (-0.53) (-1.35) (-2.46) (-2.28) (-2.63) (-1.09) (-2.60) (-1.11) (-3.51) (-0.64) (-4.16) (-0.71)
Observations 14488 14439 14460 13965 14190 14168 14415 13238 13380 14058 12327 14250 8712
Table 18: Unemployment, General and Political Trust, and Political Beliefs
2SLS Estimates with Regional Fixed-Effects and Time Fixed-Effects. 2000-2014
Panel A. Full Sample
Panel B1. Males
Panel B2. Females
Panel C1. Young (Up to 30 Years)
Unemployment -0.2843***-0.2245***-0.2758** -0.8522*** -0.7080*** -0.5018*** -0.2110** -0.5804*** -0.1352 -1.0067*** -0.1143 -1.0512*** -0.1403
(-3.02) (-4.45) (-2.58) (-4.70) (-4.40) (-4.04) (-2.16) (-3.82) (-1.15) (-5.97) (-1.48) (-3.89) (-0.79)
Observations 54331 54153 54242 53408 53731 53523 54013 49755 49922 53180 47921 53439 32537
Unemployment -0.4470*** -0.1457 -0.2998** -0.9288*** -0.7778*** -0.5333*** -0.1374 -0.5663*** -0.1809 -0.9763*** -0.0617 -1.3572*** -0.2363
(-3.78) (-1.43) (-2.62) (-4.97) (-4.74) (-3.83) (-1.50) (-3.44) (-1.39) (-5.67) (-0.60) (-4.34) (-0.97)
Observations 35050 34850 34963 34101 34464 33811 34620 29932 29868 33361 30622 34542 20178
Unemployment -0.0996 -0.0307 -0.1428* -0.7883*** -0.6388*** -0.3702** -0.0279 -0.4264** 0.0386 -0.8687*** -0.0234 -1.2547*** -0.2134
(-1.28) (-0.42) (-1.69) (-4.71) (-4.26) (-2.48) (-0.27) (-2.59) -0.39 (-4.42) (-0.34) (-5.33) (-1.12)
Observations 29699 29643 29666 29332 29449 29421 29580 28028 28360 29415 27639 29299 19299
Unemployment -0.3595***-0.2154***-0.2756** -0.8332*** -0.6881*** -0.5319*** -0.2070** -0.5873*** -0.2105* -0.9727*** -0.0974 -1.0480*** -0.1466
t-stat (-3.43) (-3.29) (-2.47) (-4.30) (-4.14) (-4.22) (-2.14) (-3.91) (-1.69) (-5.79) (-1.17) (-3.94) (-0.79)
Observations 74171 73800 74000 72143 72937 72082 73469 64900 64813 71185 63231 72933 42134
Panel C2. Middle-Age (31-60 Years)
Panel C3. Old (Over 60 Years)
Panel D1. Attended College
Panel D2. Have Not Attended College
The table reports OLS estimates, associating general interpersonal trust, trust towards institutions, and political beliefs at the individual level with regional unemployment. All specifications include
NUTS2 fixed-effects and ESS round (time) fixed-effects (constants not reported).  All specifications include as controls for age, age squared, gender, 5 education fixed effects, 8 religion fixed effects,
marital status and 51 occupation fixed effects. Regional unemployment data come from Eurostat. Panel A reports results on the full sample of respondents. Panel B distinguishes between males (Panel
B1) and females (Panel B2). Panel C distinguishes by three age groups, “young” (Panel A), “middle-age” (Panel B) and “old” (Panel C). Panel D distinguished by education, between college-graduates
(Panel D1) and non-college graduates (Panel D2). Information on trust and beliefs come from the European Social Surveys (ESS). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources.
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.
Majority
Race/Ethnic
Group
Different
Race/Ethnic
Group
Poor Non-EU
Countries Economy
Cultural
Life
Country
Better/Worse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment -0.4681** -0.4870*** -0.5436*** -0.7209*** -0.1771** -0.3345***
(-2.35) (-3.72) (-3.66) (-5.92) (-2.08) (-3.69)
Observations 101010 100836 100615 99430 99250 99091
Unemployment -0.4555** -0.5003*** -0.5492*** -0.7891*** -0.1981** -0.3511***
(-2.21) (-3.44) (-3.34) (-6.57) (-2.30) (-3.65)
Observations 45730 45635 45577 45464 45106 45112
Unemployment -0.4686** -0.4615*** -0.5288*** -0.6587*** -0.1523 -0.3119***
(-2.33) (-3.55) (-3.64) (-4.92) (-1.61) (-3.38)
Observations 55229 55149 54987 53918 54094 53931
Unemployment -0.4739*** -0.3370*** -0.4207*** -0.4670*** -0.0422 -0.1544
(-2.69) (-2.72) (-3.53) (-5.93) (-0.48) (-1.47)
Observations 14206 14196 14187 14062 14128 14002
Unemployment -0.4470** -0.4923*** -0.5241*** -0.7266*** -0.1770* -0.3410***
(-2.26) (-3.55) (-3.32) (-5.85) (-1.79) (-3.39)
Observations 52951 52890 52816 52577 52533 52263
Unemployment -0.5580** -0.6374*** -0.7023*** -0.9328*** -0.3406*** -0.4751***
(-2.39) (-4.39) (-4.06) (-4.97) (-3.00) (-3.75)
Observations 33847 33744 33606 32785 32584 32821
Panel B2. Females
Panel C1. Young (Up to 30 Years)
Panel C2. Middle-Age (31-60 Years)
Panel C3. Old (Over 60 Years)
Table 19. Unemployment and Beliefs on Immigration
Allow Immigrants Immigrants' Role
Panel A. Full Sample
Panel B1. Males
Unemployment -0.4086* -0.3240** -0.3769** -0.5872*** -0.0573 -0.2776***
(-1.85) (-2.29) (-2.22) (-4.61) (-0.68) (-2.82)
Observations 29127 29095 29045 29077 29285 28944
Unemployment -0.4784** -0.5348*** -0.5956*** -0.7689*** -0.2170** -0.3600***
(-2.41) (-3.95) (-4.07) (-5.88) (-2.26) (-3.60)
Observations 71878 71736 71565 70347 69960 70142
The table reports OLS estimates, associating attitudes-beliefs on immigration at the individual level with regional unemployment. All
specifications include NUTS2 fixed-effects and ESS round (time) fixed-effects (constants not reported).  All specifications include as controls for
age, age squared, gender, 5 education fixed effects, 8 religion fixed effects, marital status and 51 occupation fixed effects. Regional unemployment
data come from Eurostat. Panel A reports results on the full sample of respondents. Panel B distinguishes between males (Panel B1) and females
(Panel B2). Panel C distinguishes by three age groups, “young” (Panel A), “middle-age” (Panel B) and “old” (Panel C). Panel D distinguished by
education, between college-graduates (Panel D1) and non-college graduates (Panel D2). Information on trust and beliefs come from the European
Social Surveys (ESS). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-
level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.
Panel D1. Attended College
Panel H. Have Not Attended College
